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primarily rural, economy? How much do intergenerational linkages contribute to 
current inequality? We address these questions using original survey data on 
Senegal that include an individualized measure of consumption. While 
intergenerational linkages are evident, we find a relatively high degree of mobility 
across generations, associated with the shift from farm to non-farm sectors and 
greater economic activity of women. Male-dominated bequests of land and 
housing bring little gain to consumption and play little role in explaining 
inequality, though they have important effects on sector of activity. Inheritance of 
non-land assets and the education and occupation of parents (especially the 
mother) and their choices about children's schooling are more important to adult 
welfare than property inheritance. Significant gender inequality in consumption is 
evident, though it is almost entirely explicable in terms of factors such as 
education and (non-land) inheritance. There are a number of other pronounced 
gender differences, with intergenerational linkages coming through the mother 
rather than the father. 
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1.  Introduction 
Traditional agrarian economies are often thought to have limited intergenerational 
mobility and (hence) highly persistent inequality. However, while intergenerational mobility has 
long been a subject of research in developed countries, the issue has received relatively little 
attention in poor, primarily agrarian, economies.2 In particular, we know very little about how 
much of the inequality seen in such economies is associated with the linkages across generations 
through inheritance of assets and occupations, bequests, parental choices on schooling and 
parental characteristics. Inheritance of agricultural land—the main non-labor factor of 
production—is probably the first mechanism one thinks of for the intergenerational transmission 
of inequality in such settings. However, education could well be at least as important, especially 
in facilitating diversification into more remunerative non-farm activities. Are these economies 
characterized by a high degree of intergenerational persistence of poverty and affluence, or is 
there churning associated with successes and failures for adults taking up new economic 
opportunities? How much do intergenerational linkages and parental characteristics matter to 
adult living standards and economic activities?  
We also know very little about inter-personal inequality in living standards, including 
between men and women. This reflects a long-standing limitation of the available survey data on 
consumption, namely that these data are almost invariably collected at the household level. 
Inequality and poverty measures typically assume equality within households. Since adult 
women are generally married, it is difficult to separate their own welfare from that of their 
husbands on the basis of household data. However, gender dimensions of inequality are 
considered important. Male control over land and its inheritance has long been a prominent 
gender issue in development studies.3 Maternal education and work experience might also be 
expected to play a role. It has often been argued that maternal education has an important 
influence on children’s health, nutritional status and schooling.4 There might also be implications 
for adult welfare and economic activity, though there has been less research on this 
intergenerational linkage.    
                                                            
2 A large sociology literature discusses this question, with seminal books by Blau and Duncan (1967) and 
Goldthorpe (1987). 
3 In the context of land rights in Africa see Gray and Kevane (1999) for an overview of the issues.   
4 See, for example, Haveman and Wolfe (1995), and Hill and King (1995). The causal interpretation of these 
correlations can be questioned given the possibility of inter-generationally correlated latent factors; see Behrman 
and Rosenzweig (2002). Dumas and Lambert (2011) find that maternal education plays a weaker role once properly 
instrumented. 
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This paper helps fill this gap in our knowledge on intergenerational mobility and the 
transmission of inter-personal inequality in a poor, primarily rural, economy. The central 
question we address is how important various intergenerational linkages are to consumption 
inequality among adults. The paper takes advantage of an unusual new dataset for Senegal that 
measures consumption at a relatively disaggregated level within the household, so that we can 
build an “individualized” consumption-based welfare measure, to be matched with 
individualized data on inheritance and various control variables. The data also allow us to 
distinguish intergenerational linkages by gender. 
We model individual adult consumption as a function of various intergenerational 
linkages, including land inheritance, education and parental characteristics (including 
occupation), with controls for other individual characteristics. In keeping with past literature, we 
treat inheritance as conditionally exogenous (conditional on our controls).5 However, that 
assumption can be questioned (as we discuss later) and so we will test robustness to relaxing  
exogeneity, under the assumption that the father’s death more than two years ago is excludable 
from the consumption regressions, i.e., that the past death only matters via inheritance.  
We use our model of individual consumption to attribute overall consumption inequality 
to these explanatory factors. Here we use the Shorrocks’s (1982) “natural decomposition,” as 
adapted to a linear regression function following Fields (2003). Using the same regression 
models and identification strategy, the paper also examines the role of intergenerational linkages 
in occupational and geographic mobility between parents and their offspring.   
We find negligible consumption gain from land inheritance. Other sources of 
intergenerational linkages such as parental education and occupation, as well as parental 
investments in own education, appear to play a much bigger role in raising consumption. These 
factors also emerge as significant determinants of the intergenerational transition from farm to 
non-farm activity and geographic mobility, both likely to be linked with higher consumption. 
Land inheritance makes it more likely that one will remain a farmer and stay in rural areas.  
Interestingly, it is also associated with a move from farm to non-farm occupational status but 
only for men who do not also inherit responsibility for the extended household.  In general, 
formal schooling brings higher returns in consumption terms than the inheritance of physical 
assets. Nevertheless, it is only for men that education is correlated with a higher probability of 
engaging in non-farm activities and moving away from the parental location of residence. 
                                                            
5 Indeed, inheritance has been used as an instrumental variable for current wealth and land rights in 
explaining various dimensions of current living standards and land productivity. Examples include Besley (1995) 
and Akresh et al. (2010). 
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Overall, the inheritance of physical assets (land and housing) plays little role in explaining 
consumption inequality, even among rural households. 
These results lead us to question the traditional model of a developing economy with 
imperfect credit markets in which privately-owned land is a marketable asset generating an 
income stream exclusively for the designated individual owner. But our results are easier to 
understand in the light of richer models of rural economies with limited market development. We 
already know from the literature (in anthropology as well as economics) that market failures and 
non-market allocation processes play an important role in how land is used. As anthropologists 
have emphasized, agricultural land inheritance in much of Africa is typically filtered through 
customary land allocation processes involving kinship or community groups.6 Inheritance signals 
a change in responsibility, such that the recipient of land inherits obligations as well as an asset, 
and it is an asset that is not easily monetized to support other productive investments.  
The impacts of inheritance will naturally reflect how the “dynastic family” allocates its 
resources, given the market and institutional environment. In principle at least, the extended 
family has the ability to attain any desired distribution of consumption, independently of the 
formal assignment of ownership rights. Indeed, it is an open question in this setting whether 
there is any net impact on the inheritor of a land bequest within the family. 
Our results suggest that other mechanisms for the intergenerational transmission of 
inequality—notably related to parental education including assortative matching, and children’s 
schooling—are more important than land inheritance in explaining interpersonal economic 
welfare and economic activities in Senegal. Even in very poor settings, parental background can 
influence the schooling, expectations, and life chances generally, of children in ways that matter 
to the realized living standards of adults. Our results support this view, echoing other findings in 
the literature.7 Some degree of intergenerational correlation in occupational choices can be 
expected, for which we find supportive evidence.  
In the following section, we begin by discussing what is currently known about 
intergenerational linkages in developing economies. We then describe our data for Senegal and 
the setting in Section 3. Section 4 briefly examines occupational mobility.  The methods of 
analysis and our empirical results on the intergenerational effects on consumption, economic 
                                                            
6 For an overview of the issues see Shipton and Goheen (1992). Also see the discussion in Platteau (2000). 
7  Estudillo et al. (2001) emphasize the combination of both land inheritance and schooling in the inter-
generational transmission of wealth in the rural Philippines. Lesorogol et al. (2011) find that the current wealth of 
Kenyan pastoralists is correlated with parental wealth and formal education but not with livestock inheritance.  
Ferreira and Gignoux (2010) find that family background characteristics are an important source of unequal 
opportunities in Latin America. Dumas and Lambert (2011) find that parental education has a strong effect on child 
schooling in Senegal. 
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activity and geographic mobility are discussed in the next 2 sections, while Section 7 explores 
various tests of robustness. Section 8 examines the implications for understanding inter-personal 
inequality, while a final section concludes.  
2. Intergenerational linkages in a developing economy 
 A still small but growing literature has studied how parents go about assigning various 
assets across their children in developing countries. Quisumbing et al. (2004) and Estudillo et al. 
(2001), explore the parental allocation decision over land transfers and investments in education, 
from the point of view of gender equity.  Using data for the Philippines, Sumatra and Ghana, 
they argue that parents aim to equalize economic well-being across their offspring, which may 
well result in unequal inheritance of specific assets given gender differences in returns.  
Intergenerational transfers thus reflect parents’ expectations of returns to land and human capital 
assets and allow multiple sources of linkages and substitution. La Ferrara and Milazzo (2012) 
also document how parents strategize and substitute land and education transfers to their 
offspring in Ghana.  They examine how a reform in inheritance law alters the transmission of 
human capital investments and land from parents to sons and daughters in Ghana. As posited by 
the authors, the relaxation of matrilineal rules of descent results in a reallocation away from 
schooling and towards land transfers that is more pronounced for boys and only evident for 
matrilineal (Akan) households. Akan sons are also found to be significantly more likely to be 
farmers post reform.  
 Although not our immediate focus in this paper, a strand of the literature has also focused 
on spousal inheritance at divorce or widowhood, and impacts thereof (Cooper and Bird 2012; 
Peterman 2012; Kumar and Quisumbing, 2012a and b). For example, Kumar and Quisumbing 
(2012b) investigate the impact of changes in Family Law and land registration procedures 
favorable to women in Ethiopia on married women’s perceptions of asset and child custody 
allocations in the event of divorce. Reform induced changes in attitudes are found to have 
increased women’s well-being but also led to intergenerational linkages through increased 
investments in child schooling. 
Similar types of intergenerational transmission mechanisms are also emphasized in the 
literature documenting the role of property ownership, most prominently land, in enhancing 
women’s status and bargaining power within the household with spillover effects on child human 
and physical capital (for example, Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Quisumbing 2009). Such 
female control over assets is often obtained through parental bequests.    
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 There has been a lacuna of research on intergenerational mobility in Africa.  Indeed, we 
know of only one paper addressing the issue, focusing on the intergenerational mobility between 
agricultural and non-agricultural occupations in five countries, namely Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Guinea, Madagascar and Uganda. In explaining the revealed variance in intergenerational 
occupational mobility across the countries, Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013) emphasize educational 
immobility in Madagascar and the pronounced duality in the spatial distribution of employment 
in the other countries, which the authors link to the countries’ respective colonial histories.      
The assignment of land ownership is naturally expected to play a role in any rural 
economy and this has been a theme in the development literature. Private ownership of land 
(with or without a formal title) is typically viewed as a form of private wealth, which is expected 
to deliver exclusively to its owner an income stream derived from the productive capacity of the 
owned land. In the context of a mainly rural market-based economy, one thus expects land 
ownership to play an important role in determining the individual’s standard of living. Land 
inheritance is one way of acquiring ownership. Thus land inheritance should be important to the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality and also to economic activity, including 
diversification into non-farm production, especially when credit is unavailable. Development 
policy debates have sometimes focused on inheritance laws, especially reforms aiming to 
improve women’s rights.8 
Taxation policies have also emphasized land ownership as a basis for assigning taxes, 
including in poor rural economies. Famously, Henry George, the American political economist 
of the late 19th century, advocated taxes on the value of land, and (of course) these were to be 
levied on the designated owner. Taxes on land are found in almost all countries. Also, transfers 
and various direct interventions are often targeted according to land holding, defined by 
ownership. These include policies aiming to redistribute land itself. Tenure security is 
traditionally defined in terms of individual titles of private ownership. There have been many 
efforts (often supported by external development assistance) to foster individual ownership 
through land titling, with expected benefits to the government in efforts to tax land value, and 
also expected gains in both efficiency (promoting land investment through greater tenure security 
and access to credit) and equity (notably in promoting women's empowerment).9 
                                                            
8 Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2011), Kumar and Quisumbing (2012b), Deininger et al. (2010) and Roy 
(2011) find evidence that legal reforms related to property rights have brought gains to women (the first two in 
Ethiopia and the other two in India).  
9 On the expected land productivity gains from titling see Feder and Noronha (1987), Barrows, and Roth 
(1990), Besley (1995) and Deininger (2003). 
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However, it is far from clear how relevant this standard model of land as a form of 
marketable and productive wealth is to poor rural economies where land markets are thin or non-
existent and imperfect (and asymmetric) information and long-established social institutions play 
an important role in how land is allocated and used. The benefits from efforts to foster individual 
ownership titles are known to be uncertain when individual titling is introduced in an indigenous 
system of tenure, which is probably why the evidence that such efforts have had their expected 
benefits appears to be mixed.10 
Inheritance of the family farm may well bring enhanced individual power within the 
family—interpretable as a non-pecuniary gain—but it undoubtedly also comes with 
responsibilities and constraints. Past observations about African agriculture lead one to question 
the extent of the gains to the inheritor of land, who may have to take on various obligations. 
These naturally include responsibility for the family as an economic unit, but they may also 
extend well beyond the immediate, and even the extended, family. Anthropologists have 
emphasized the social responsibilities that come with acquired wealth such as through land 
ownership, notably in Africa. As Shipton and Goheen (1992, p.311) note with reference to land 
in rural Africa, “Rights often entail duties. .. Cultivation and grazing rights may entail 
obligations to share farm products beyond the domestic group.”  Similarly, with reference to the 
Luo people of Kenya, Shipton (1992, p. 361) argues that “Rights of individuals [over land] were 
not thought sacrosanct, but instead they interlocked with the rights of others, and overlapped 
with those of families and wider groups.” Individual responsibilities within a village economy 
are often embedded in broader social ties, interpretable as means of enforcing cooperative 
equilibria that bring collective benefits (Platteau, 2000). Whether such responsibilities come with 
a consumption incentive is unclear on a priori grounds, given that there are also likely to be non-
pecuniary benefits and costs.  
In much of Africa, the local state and community governance are involved in land 
allocation, as are traditional, customary, non-market kin-based allocation processes. In particular, 
land that is not kept in use and looked after appropriately risks appropriation by the community 
in many rural economies: the lineage or household head is thus in charge of making sure this 
doesn’t happen so as to insure the family’s long-term security. Further, membership of a 
(potentially large) extended family often conveys rights to work the family’s land holding and/or 
share in its bounty. These arrangements can mean that individual land ownership conveys 
                                                            
10 Ensminger(1997) discusses the conflict between private property rights introduced in the context of 
customary norms and institutions in Kenya. Deininger (2003) reviews the evidence.  A recent example of a study 
pointing to success of land titling in raising productivity is Holden et al. (2009); an example finding little or no 
impact is Jacoby and Minten (2007). 
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obligations and associated costs to the owner, especially if he or she is also the head of 
household. As noted by Ensminger (1997) “Lineages are not just kinfolk…they cooperate in 
labor, risk management, and investment. Fundamental to the high level of trust and cooperation 
that such systems enjoy are basic guarantees of subsistence in the short run – through access to 
land – and the long run through inheritance of that land.” (p.165). One cannot even rule out 
consumption losses to the inheritor. Without a land market it will be hard for the recipient to 
“cash in” the land to finance some other (non-farm) investment. The lack of a land market may 
then create occupational stickiness, whereby the bequest of land inhibits the recipient’s transition 
to non-farm activities (though possibly enhancing the scope for such a transition by others in the 
family). Land-market failures may even entail that the (say) eldest son who gets the land and the 
responsibilities of being the head of household ends up trapped in farming, while his siblings see 
new opportunities for diversification into non-farm activities.  
Indeed, inheriting the land but without the responsibilities of headship may allow the 
recipient to leave the land to take up some non-farm activity. As already noted, given weak 
market and governmental institutions for risk-sharing, the family farm is known to serve a social 
security role in traditional societies. The recipient of the land bequest may then effectively 
transfer the right to other family members (the mother, spouse, and children). Their security (at 
some minimal level) is thus assured, and the son is free to seek work or start an enterprise 
elsewhere, such as in an urban area. However, one can also imagine situations in which non-
market factors in the allocation of command over the product of land can discourage agriculture, 
even for the household head, in favor of other (non-farm) activities possibly outside the village 
economy. This can happen when the non-market allocation rules entail a sharing of the product 
of land, and that the sharing rule entails that inheriting extra land reduces the marginal product of 
the owner’s effort in farming relative to other uses of labor time, thus generating a substitution 
toward non-farm activities. This is a distortion to inter-sectoral allocation, in the sense that 
marginal products of labor become unequal between activities. In principle, such an inefficiency 
could be avoided if the family is well informed about other (non-farm) income sources, so 
allowing sharing rules based on total income.  
Finally, it is worth underlining that land inheritance can be accompanied by learning 
within kinship groups—a source of specific human capital that may play an important role in the 
welfare gains from inheritance. It is widely believed that traditional farming practices in 
developing countries are characterized by a high degree of farm-specific knowledge, 
accumulated through experience farming the same land. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) have 
emphasized the role of family-specific information in explaining intergenerational and intra-
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household land transfers, including inheritance; they find support for the claim that specific-
knowledge about the family farm entails that land is kept within the family rather than being 
sold. This could also explain why land markets are often thin or non-existent and also why the 
extended family is so common in poor rural economies, given that the older generation will have 
accumulated greater knowledge about the family farm. As long as the extended family can share 
knowledge there will be little economic loss at the death of the head of the household, though 
one can imagine circumstances (including unanticipated deaths) when that is not the case.  
We have seen that in the context of a poor rural economy, and in the African context 
more specifically, land inheritance may be a mixed blessing. The same is true of the other main 
intergenerational linkage, namely parental investments in their children’s education. It is well 
understood that the parental decision to favor one son (say) with extra schooling comes with an 
implicit (and sometimes quite explicit) contract for that son to share a steady stream of his 
subsequent earnings. These arrangements, and the redistributive pressures on economically 
successful household members, as synthetized by Platteau ( 2006), are thought to be common in 
Africa and there is supportive anecdotal evidence for Senegal (Boltz and Villar, 2013). The son’s 
own consumption gain from schooling is then reduced according to how much is to be sent 
home, or shared within the larger family group if the son remains resident. (Identifying the 
individual consumption gain in this case may also require data on consumption within the 
household.) 
The upshot of these observations is that inheritance of land and educational attainments 
can have ambiguous effects on welfare and economic activities. The linkages may well be quite 
weak. The rest of this paper will address these issues empirically using an unusual data set for 
Senegal. 
3. Setting and data 
The data used here come from an original survey entitled Pauvreté et Structure Familiale 
(Poverty and Family Structure, henceforth PSF) conducted in Senegal in 2006/2007. The PSF 
survey stems from the cooperation between a team of French researchers and the National 
Statistical Agency of Senegal.11  The survey is described in detail in De Vreyer et al. (2008). 
                                                            
11 Momar B. Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie of 
Senegal (ANSD) on the one hand and Philippe De Vreyer (University of Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL) Sylvie 
Lambert (PSE) and Abla Safir (now with the World Bank) designed the survey. The data collection was conducted 
by the ANSD thanks to the funding of the IDRC (International Development Research Center), INRA Paris and 
CEPREMAP. 
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The PSF covers a sample of over 1800 households spread over 150 clusters drawn 
randomly from the census districts so as to insure a nationally representative sample.  About 
1,750 household records can be exploited, covering 14,450 individuals. The survey describes a 
population of which the majority (57%) live in rural areas, 48% are male and 95% are Muslim—
statistics that accord well with other sources (World Bank, 2009). Despite more than half of the 
country’s close to 12.5 million inhabitants in 2009 being rural, the contribution of agriculture to 
GDP amounts to only 18%.  Like other African countries, Senegal has seen considerable 
population urbanization; at the time of independence in 1960 rural areas were the home of 77% 
of the population. Urbanization over time is evident in the survey in that amongst those adults 
who had a father in rural areas, 22% now live in urban areas. A similar percentage of those 
whose mother lived in rural areas also do so.   
Senegalese households are large, with slightly more than eight members on average in the 
PSF. The families are typically multigenerational and extended both horizontally and vertically, 
with 36% of household members that are neither the head, nor one of his wives or children. Two 
thirds of households include such “extended” family members. Polygamous unions are common, 
with 24% of married men and 37% of married women engaged in such unions. Most of these 
comprise a husband and two wives (only 20% of polygamous unions have more than two wives). 
We find that 31% of polygamous men have non-cohabiting wives. In half of these cases, the 
husband is either considered the head of both households, or of one, while one of the wives is 
considered head of the other household. In the other half, a married polygamous woman lives in 
a separate household headed by a relative (mainly her father, brother or son).  
In addition to the usual information on individual characteristics, the survey collected 
details on each household’s structure and budgetary arrangements. To best reflect intra-
household structure and resource allocation, each household was divided into groups or “cells” 
according to the following rules: the head of household and unaccompanied dependent members, 
such as his widowed parent or his children whose mothers do not live in the same household, are 
grouped together. Any unmarried brothers of the head would also be considered in his cell.  Each 
wife of the head and her children and any other dependents then form separate cells. Other 
women with children or other dependents and whose husbands are not present, are also 
considered cell heads.  The same goes for any other family nucleus such as a married child of the 
household head with his/her spouse and children, or a sister of the household’s head residing in 
the household with her children (after divorce or while her husband looks for a job). This 
disaggregation emerged from field interviews as being the relevant way to split the household 
11 
 
into its component groups.  It is worth noting that enumerators saw this as a natural way to 
divide households and had no difficulty collecting the data accordingly.  
Consumption expenditures are recorded in several parts: first all common expenditures 
are collected (housing, electricity bills etc). Food expenditures are compiled based on a detailed 
account of who shares which meal and how much money is specifically used to prepare the meal. 
These are the “DQ” or “dépenses quotidiennes” ─ the name the Senegalese give to the amount of 
money a woman has at her disposal to buy fresh ingredients for the meals of the day. Next 
individual consumption is collected at the group level (such as clothing, mobile phone, 
transportation, and food outside the home expenditures). Finally, expenditures that are shared 
between several cells but not the whole household are collected.  
A measure of per capita consumption can then be constructed at the cell level allowing us 
to identify unequal consumption levels within households. Subgroups also emerge that take some 
or all of their meals separately (in 17% of households), thus widening the possibility for 
differences in nutritional intake among household members. Thanks to these data we can 
construct a relatively individualized measure of consumption, which is almost never available in 
household surveys. This is what we will use to assess individual economic welfare. The measure 
we use here is the amount of expenditures specific to the cell and not shared with any other cell 
plus the cell’s imputed share of the household’s joint expenditures per person.  
We will restrict our study to individuals who are heads of their cells. For consumption 
purposes, they are assumed to be the decision makers at the cell level.12 We are therefore left 
with 4401 observations, of which 56.8% are women. 75% of cell heads are household heads or 
the head’s spouse, 7.5% are daughters of the head, and 3% are daughters-in-law. The average 
number of cells per household is 2.51. The range is from 1 to 12; 81% of the sampled households 
have more than one cell.  
In this sample, average per capita total consumption amounts to about 276 000 CFA 
francs per year, which corresponds to nearly $925 US in 2005 PPP exchange rates for 
consumption, or about $2.50 per day. When looking at total expenditures, inequalities within the 
household are evident: the ratio between the expenditures of the richest and the poorest cell 
within a household can be as high as 18 and is still equal to 4.4 after trimming off the 5% most 
unequal households. Computing an inequality index for the distribution of cash expenditures in 
the population, we find a Gini index of 59.8% if we attribute to each person the average per 
                                                            
12  Note that this sample is not representative of the adult population in Senegal.  For example, among adult 
women, wives of household heads are over-represented, while daughters of the head are under-represented. It is 
nevertheless representative of the adult population that has at least one dependent.  
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capita consumption level in his or her household. The index is 62.7% if instead each individual is 
attributed the per capita consumption in his cell (i.e. the sum of the per capita expenditures 
specific to the cell and of the cell’s share of common household expenditures, distributed on a 
per capita basis within the cell). The Gini index of inequality in the distribution of the cell-
specific component of cash expenditures (ignoring the joint consumption within the household) 
is 77.9%. 
The individualized consumption data also reveal a sizeable gender gap. Regressing the 
log of cell consumption on gender, the regression coefficient (the difference in mean log 
consumption) is 0.57 and is significant at the 1% level (t=14.92). 
Importantly for the purpose of our paper, these data include information on parental 
characteristics and inheritance. If the parent has died, the survey asked whether he or she left any 
inheritance and then, for each person, whether they obtained any inheritance in the form of land, 
housing, money, durable goods or productive capital. No valuation of these inheritances was 
obtained.13 In particular, we do not know how much land was inherited.  For this reason we will 
use a dummy variable indicating whether land was inherited or not (and likewise for the other 
forms of inheritance). This may well affect the size and significance of our estimates, although 
the endogeneity concerns (which we return to) would clearly be even greater using amounts of 
inherited land rather than simply the incidence of inheritance.  
On paper, agricultural land is allocated through local community level administrative 
processes in Senegal. Since 1964, most of the land (between 95 and 98%) has been owned by the 
state and part of what is called the national domain (Caveriviére 1986; Boone 2007). Allocation 
and use is reserved for those who belong to the local community or kinship group (Boone 2007). 
Land use rights are attributed by local land committees on the basis of needs and capacity to 
farm. This land cannot be sold and in theory cannot be bequeathed either. As a result, rural land 
markets are very weak. A land reform aiming to strengthen the security of use rights and to 
facilitate market transfers was attempted in 2004. Following extensive consultations with rural 
producers and civil society, the Law for agro-sylvo-pastoral development (LOASP) was finally 
enacted in 2004 but its land component was dropped due to a lack of consensus. The specific fear 
was that communities would be at risk of being dispossessed of lands not yet formally attributed 
by the local land committees. The need for a land reform is still being discussed.  
The unequal access to land across gender is also a source of concern in Senegal. The legal 
setting has recently evolved to try to fight this source of gender inequality. The constitution of 
                                                            
13  This is information that households were firmly unwilling to reveal, probably because inheritance rules are 
well established and contrary to what is universally asserted, are not in actual fact adhered to. 
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2001 finally granted women the right to own land. They have only been allowed to be on the 
local land committees in charge of the attribution of use rights since May 2010. Hence, in the 
past, women very rarely received land through this allocation mechanism. There has been little 
progress in the last decade. In its 2011 report on land policy in West Africa, the Economic 
Commission for Africa still emphasizes Senegalese women’s very poor access to land (UNECA 
2011). 
Despite the legal setting described above, the reality on the ground is that land bequests 
are common. Our survey data indicate that, in our sample of cell heads, 32% of men and 43% of 
those whose fathers have died, but only 17% (28%) of women, report that they inherited land. 
Looking at all forms of inheritance (including housing, durables, money and productive assets) 
54% of men in the sample inherited something, while 38% of women did so. In practice, heirs 
are given priority over land use rights relative to other potential users. Hence, inheritance of 
paternal lineage land is an important means of access to ownership. In our survey, we observe 
very few changes in land ownership over the five years preceding the survey. Nevertheless, half 
of the cases where the amount of land owned increased are due to inheritance. 
 Several inheritance laws that give different treatment to women coexist in Senegal. 
Individuals can choose which law to abide by before their death.14 The French inspired 
(“modern”) system of inheritance dictates that wealth be shared equally among children, 
whatever their gender. By contrast, Islamic inheritance law (which is by far the most common 
choice) limits the inheritance of daughters to half of that of sons.15 In addition, entrenched 
tradition favors sons for inheriting land (with a small exception in Basse Casamance where there 
is slightly more access to land for women, due to strong tradition in women-dominated rice 
cultivation). Since daughters typically move to their husband’s abode, they are supposedly 
compensated by their brothers with money or other forms of wealth such as their imputed yearly 
share of the harvest, for what would have otherwise been their share of land inheritance.  
Another relevant point regarding inheritance practices is that inheritance is not always 
shared immediately after a father’s death. The heirs may carry on living in the parental house, 
using the parental land, without a formal sharing having taken place. During this period ─ which 
can last for years ─ the heirs who do not partake in the use right (typically daughters) because 
                                                            
14   If someone dies without having expressed a choice of inheritance regime, the default is supposed to be 
modern law. Nevertheless, if it can be proved that during his or her life, the defunct always behaved according to 
Islamic precepts, Islamic law can be applied. As a result, Islamic inheritance laws prevail almost universally.    
15 Although some ethnic groups in Senegal are of matrilineal tradition (such as the Lebu-Wolof-Sereer in the 
country’s north and center), such traditions have mostly been displaced by Islam when it comes to material 
inheritance (Sow, 1992). As a result, inheritance from an adult male other than the father (such as a maternal uncle 
or foster parent for example) is now a rare occurrence. 
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they live somewhere else, are not compensated.  Although they are, in practice, owners of their 
share, they cannot cash it in.  In this paper, we do not consider pre-mortem gifts as inheritance. 
These do not appear to be prevalent. Sons may receive some money to help pay the bride price 
and to settle down upon getting married. However, such transfers are not taken into account in 
the sharing of inheritance. 
As can be seen in Table 1, 72% of deceased fathers left some form of inheritance to their 
children and 32% left land bequests.  In contrast, only 22% of deceased mothers transmitted any 
inheritance, while 2% left land.  Fathers bequeath their wealth to their sons more often than to 
their daughters, particularly when it is in the form of land. Mothers treated sons and daughters 
roughly equally in this respect, although they also favored sons with the little land they 
bequeathed. The Statistical Addendum provides probits for inheritance (both land and any form 
of inheritance) with a wide range of controls for individual and parental characteristics. Even 
with these controls, we continue to find that men are more likely to inherit than women. 
Conditional on the controls, being male adds 0.11 to 0.13 to the conditional probability of 
receiving any inheritance, while it adds 0.08 to the probability of inheriting land. 
The data reveal that very few women (about 2%) have any land to transfer to their heirs 
when they die, while more than a third of men leave some land. Note that the large discrepancy 
between the above noted 17% of women reporting that they inherited land and the 2% leaving 
land is largely explained by the fact that women’s land use rights are highly revocable when their 
marital situations change.  A woman loses access to her family land when she marries, and often 
loses access to her husband’s land in the event of widowhood or divorce.  She may well also lose 
control over any land she has inherited over her lifetime. In addition, she has no decision power 
over its transmission: a deceased woman’s land is first returned to her husband (or his family) or 
to her brothers, and eventually transferred to children only at their father’s death.  
In these respects, Senegal is not unusual within Sub-Saharan Africa (Cooper 2008, 2010). 
The rights of women to land are mainly indirect (Platteau et al. 2000) and contingent on marital 
status. As a daughter living in her father’s household, a woman will work on the family land and 
eventually obtain use rights to a plot. As a wife, she’ll work on the land of her husband’s family 
and might also have use rights on her personal plot. If she is in neither of these positions, she 
simply won’t have access to land. This in part explains the high remarriage rate following 
widowhood or divorce.   
The complex nature of households in Senegal ─ reflecting households’ extended, 
multigenerational character, the prevalence of polygamy, as well as of widowhood and divorce 
followed by widespread remarriage, and of child fostering ─ together with inheritance customs, 
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means that it is important to control for household structure in explaining the role of inheritance 
and other factors in intergenerational mobility and interpersonal inequality outcomes. For 
example, a child’s inheritance and how that may affect his outcomes will be a function not only 
of his gender but likewise of the gender and number of competing siblings as well as whether 
they share the same father and mother, or just the same mother, or the same father. The 
interaction of gender and birth order may also play a determining role. We will control for all 
these factors in our regressions.   
Despite net primary schooling rates now reaching 78%, the average education in the adult 
population is still low. In the sample of cell heads we are using (hence excluding the youngest 
cohorts who have benefitted from the expansion of schooling), 30% have some formal (non 
Koranic) education.  This is the case for only 11% of those living in rural areas (47% in urban 
areas). In addition, in rural areas, 75% of people with some education never went beyond 
primary schooling. The gender gap is also quite sizeable: only 25% of women have ever had any 
formal schooling, while 35% of men have.  The gap increases with the level of education. Less 
than 40% of women with some education reached at least the secondary level, while this is true 
for half of the men who attended a formal school. Women in rural areas cumulate both 
disadvantages and only 8% of them have ever been to a formal school. In all cases our education 
variable is defined as a dummy for whether the individual has some formal education.  
A statistical addendum is available from the authors providing summary statistics on the 
main PSF variables. 
4. Occupational mobility 
The first form of intergenerational linkage we consider is in occupations.  Do sons of 
farmers tend to be farmers?  What about daughters?  Are there links with mothers’ occupation?  
Information was collected on the occupation and education of each parent for each individual. 
The last place of the mother and father’s residence is also known allowing us to know whether 
an individual resides in the same village as his parents.     
Occupation has been classified under four categories: agriculture, non-agriculture, other, 
or inactive.  ‘Other’ contains individuals who reported that they were active but not employers, 
wage workers, or self-employed.  As their activities are not known to us, we are unable to 
classify them into farm/non-farm and so have kept them as a separate group.16 Inactive includes 
                                                            
16 Our hunch is that this group is made up primarily of marabouts (religious leaders), and others engaged in 
traditional positions or as traditional social leaders such as griots (village story tellers), traditional healers, 
circumcisers and midwives.    
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“housewives,” students, and those unable to work due, for example, to disability. Table 2 gives 
the joint distribution of occupations for parents and their children, for men and women.17 We 
find that 36% of individuals had a father working in agriculture, while 22% declare that their 
mother was in agriculture.  It is likely that mothers were identified as housewives even when 
they did modest agricultural work, so that those who report being in agriculture probably 
dedicated considerable time to this occupation, suggesting relatively poor households. When the 
mother is declared a farmer, in 72% of the cases, the father is also in farming. More generally, 
parents’ sectors of activity are highly correlated. 
Women have been moving out of an almost exclusive focus on (or self-identification 
with) household work over time. We find that 38% of sampled women were coded as “inactive” 
but that this was true of 58% of their mothers. Over one third of those with inactive mothers 
went into the non-farm sector, with far fewer (13%) going into farming. Very few women have a 
mother whose occupation is classified as “other,” but the reproduction over time is quite strong.  
Over half of those women are themselves classified in other. This is quite understandable if as 
we believe, the category consists mostly of traditional non-farm occupations that require skills 
and possibly reputations built up and transmitted across generations.  
Table 2 suggests considerable intergenerational mobility out of farming. Only one third 
of the one third of men whose father worked in agriculture stayed in the sector, though there is 
somewhat stronger persistence with respect to mother’s sector with 43% of the men (33% of the 
women) who declared that their mother was working in agriculture doing so as well. One 
explanation for this is that poorer farm households are both more likely to have had a mother in 
farming and to be less mobile. Participation in the non-farm sector was more persistent across 
generations, with nearly three-quarters of those men whose father worked in the non-farm sector 
being also recorded as working in that sector. A significant amount of persistence is also 
apparent with respect to “other” for mothers and their sons (74% of sons with mothers in “other” 
were also classified that way) as well as their daughters (53%).There is little occupational 
stickiness for fathers engaged in “other” and daughters, although close to half of sons followed in 
their footsteps.   
There seems to be considerable persistence in occupations across generations.  How does 
this compare to other developing countries? A common measure of mobility is the odds ratio 
                                                            
17 Interviewers were instructed to collect information on parents’ last held occupations prior to retirement. 
Older adults do not typically say they are ‘retired’ or are not described this way unless they were public servants and 
receive a pension which is relatively rare. They more typically refer to themselves as being in the occupation they 
spent the last part of their working lives in. This can pose a problem to measures of occupational mobility since it is 
not uncommon for older men to return to their natal village and become farmers. 
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(widely used in quantitative sociology), which has the advantage that it can be compared with 
similar calculations for other countries. To help assure comparability with Bossuroy and 
Cogneau (2013) we confine our calculations to the odds ratio given by the ratio of the odds of the 
son being in the non-farm (NF) sector when his father was in that sector to the odds of the son 
having switched to NF when the father was in the farm (F) sector.18 The odds ratio is then:19 
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==−===    (1) 
Here p(.) denotes the empirical probability of the term in parentheses where x=k denotes that the 
father is in sector k (=NF,F) and y=k denotes this for the son. Table 2 gives the results. The OR 
for fathers and sons of 5.5 suggests a relatively high degree of mobility. Amongst the nine 
developing countries for which results are reported in Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013), Senegal is 
the third most mobile (behind Ghana and Uganda). At the other extreme, India is the least mobile 
with an odds ratio of 32, clearly reflecting the caste system.  
Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013) only give results for fathers and sons, but we can repeat 
the calculation for mothers and daughters and the cross-effects, as given in Table 2. We find that 
women are less mobile than men, with a “mothers-daughters” odds ratio of 10.7. We also find 
that there is more occupational mobility for daughters relative to their father’s sector than there is 
for sons relative to their mother’s sector.  
5.  Intergenerational effects on individual consumption 
We regress the log of individualized (cell-specific) consumption expenditure on dummy 
variables for having inherited land, housing and other assets (finance, consumer durables and 
physical capital). The regressions also include a large number of control variables to account for 
the heterogeneity in individual and household characteristics, including parental characteristics. 
Specifically we control for gender, age and age squared, age at first marriage, whether one is the 
first born of a given gender among siblings with the same mother and same father, whether one 
is the first born among all children with the same mother and father, whether the first born 
sibling from the same mother and father is a boy, number of brothers from the same father and 
                                                            
18  Our results are not perfectly comparable with Bossuroy and Cogneau because we observe the last 
occupation of the father and not, as they do, the main occupation during adulthood. As a result, we might count as 
farmers men who have worked in the urban formal sector during their active life and have returned to their village of 
origin and to agriculture for their retirement. Our expectation is that this measurement error is likely to bias mobility 
upward (odds ratio downward). 
19  This can be thought of as an inverse measure of how strong the off-diagonal elements are in the matrix 
giving the joint distribution of the data for fathers’ and sons’ occupations, as in Table 2; more precisely, one can re-
write OR in (1) as the product of the counts of the diagonal elements (F-F and NF-NF) divided by the product of the 
off-diagonal counts (F-NF, NF-F). 
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mother, number of brothers from the same father only and same mother only, and the same three 
variables for sisters, ethnic group, being Muslim relative to other religions, having some formal 
education, whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered at a young age (prior to two years of 
age, which typically implies a permanent move for the child in the Senegal context).  There are 
also controls for parental characteristics (education, occupation, place of residence, whether the 
father died in the last two years) and some demographic variables describing the household (log 
household size) and the individual’s cell (log cell size, share of adults and share of children age 5 
and under).  We begin by following past literature in assuming the exogeneity of inheritance; we 
test robustness to relaxing this in Section 7. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give results for (log) cell expenditure per person; recall that this 
combines the cell-specific expenditures with imputed values for the cell’s share of jointly 
consumed items within the household. Table 3 first presents the coefficients on inheritance 
estimated without any controls.  This is followed by coefficients estimated by adding various 
correlates, which we do in two steps: adding controls for geographic effects alone, and then 
adding the controls for individual, household and parental characteristics. We next give results 
with all controls for the full sample, and for both an urban-rural stratification and gender 
stratification in Tables 4 and 5.20  
Without any controls, inheriting land has a strong negative correlation with consumption 
(Table 3): those who inherited land have consumption that is lower by about 28%.21  But this is 
considerably attenuated when one controls for location, reflecting the fact that rural households 
tend to be both poorer and more likely to inherit land.  The negative effect is further reduced 
with the addition of other controls, remaining close to 7%. Inheriting a house is strongly 
positively correlated with consumption without controlling for location or other individual and 
household characteristics. Here again, the effect is reduced, but remains significantly positive 
when the full set of controls are added (of the order of 7%). Finally, a positive effect of other 
(non-land, non-housing) forms of inheritance emerges when conditioning on location alone.  
This finding of a small negative effect of land in the full sample with controls loses 
statistical significance in the various strata (urban/rural, male/female and the gender/location 
interaction) (Tables 4 and 5).  Here and elsewhere, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
small or insignificant estimated impacts of land inheritance are due to the fact that the variable is 
                                                            
20  Given that we control for demographics, using consumption per equivalent adult instead makes little or no 
difference to the estimates (depending on the functional form of the scale). 
21  As usual, the regression coefficient is the change in log consumption resulting from a unit change in the 
explanatory variable. Note that if the change in log consumption is x, then the proportionate change in consumption 
is ex. 
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measured as a dummy variable as opposed to land area or value, and hence does not capture 
sufficient variation. Given our data, we are unable to test this.   
Housing inheritance has a positive effect in the full sample and for urban women. The 
significant effects of other types of inheritance are confined to the urban stratum and to men. 
When we stratify by the interaction of gender with urban-rural residence, a sharper picture 
emerges on the adult consumption gains from other forms of inheritance, namely that they are 
confined to men (Table 5). Recall that we find a sizeable gender gap in consumption. Strikingly, 
this gender gap in consumption largely vanishes when we add our controls. Ceteris paribus then, 
adult male heads of cells (typically, though not always, the overall household head as well) do 
not have higher consumption than females (Table 4). Note, however, that our controls include 
variables such as schooling, which are unequal between genders. So our finding can be 
interpreted as indicating that the gender gap in consumption can be explained by the gender 
difference in individual and household characteristics.   
Along with the gender differences in characteristics, which (as we have seen) account for 
the gender disparity in consumption, there are also gender differences in returns to 
characteristics.  A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients across the 
regressions for men and women (F(72,1498) = 1.84; Prob. > F < 0.00005). 
Both own education and mother’s education are significant in the full sample 
consumption regressions. Strikingly, maternal education has a much stronger effect—a change of 
0.17 in log consumption—than paternal education, and this is due to its effect in urban areas and 
for women.  
Other parental characteristics matter. Having a father (but not a mother) who worked in 
the non-farm sector has a large and significant effect on log consumption of 0.30; having a father 
in farming has a smaller effect (0.17). (The left out category is inactive.)  These effects are 
stronger for men than for women. It is clear that parental characteristics matter, even though land 
and housing inheritance do not. 
Being fostered out as a child is associated with higher adult consumption; the effect is 
confined to men, and is stronger for those living in urban areas.  This result is consistent with the 
previously noted fact that the common practice of fostering is often associated with investment in 
the human capital of the child. Notice, however, that having been fostered out young (under age 
2) has an offsetting effect for men. The positive effect on adult welfare is for those who were not 
fostered young.22 
                                                            
22 See Beck et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of fostering practices in Senegal. On the long term impact 
of fostering in Senegal see Coppoletta et. al (2011). 
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To throw some light on the costs and benefits to adult offspring of parental sorting by 
sector and schooling, Table 6 presents the total effect on log consumption of various 
combinations of fathers’ and mothers’ characteristics using the full sample estimates. The results 
suggest that whatever the education of one’s parents, having both parents in the non-farm sector 
yields higher consumption than having both in farming. That is probably what one would expect. 
However, there is a more surprising and interesting effect of having parents from different 
sectors. The mixed combination of a father in a non-farm and a mother in a farm-related 
occupation provides the highest welfare gain to a child at any given combination of parental 
education—a higher gain than having had both in non-farm activities. This could well reflect 
longer-term benefits from a more dynamic and diversified family background. But notice that 
this only holds when it is the father who is in the non-farm sector; the reverse parental 
combination (father in farming; mother in non-farm work) yields the lowest consumption gain at 
whatever education combination is considered—even lower than having both parents in farming. 
At any given combination of parental occupation, the consumption gains are largest when 
both parents have had some formal schooling (Table 6).  Furthermore, for any parental farm and 
non-farm occupational combination, having better schooled parents is better for the offspring’s 
adult living standards. Positive parental matching on education is beneficial while positive 
sorting on sector is not (holding education and all else constant).  Finally, mothers’ formal 
education is always more welfare enhancing than fathers’ education whatever the parents’ 
combination of occupational sectors.  
6.  Intergenerational effects on economic activities and geographic mobility 
We now turn to the question of how much intergenerational linkages matter to the sector 
of economic activity and location. Table 7 summarizes the key marginal effects from probits for 
agricultural self-employment. Again, parental characteristics matter, though in some possibly 
surprising ways. Having a father in farming does not have a significant effect, but having a 
mother who was a farmer makes it more likely one will be a farmer. This is so for men and 
women, but is significantly larger for men in rural areas (consistent with the effect of having a 
mother in farming on the probability of inheriting land being positive and stronger for men). 
Having had either parent (and more so a mother) in the non-farm sector makes it less likely one 
will be a farmer in rural areas, with a far more pronounced effect for men. 
Parental schooling effects on the probability of being a farmer seem weak, though for 
urban men there is a significant negative effect of mother’s schooling. Own formal schooling 
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makes it less likely men will be in farming (particularly urban men), but makes this slightly more 
likely for urban women.  
We find that inheriting land makes farming more likely though this effect is confined to 
women in rural areas. Endogeneity is a concern here; as women rarely inherit land, those who 
remained in the same village as their parents and are in farming are more likely to be the ones 
who inherit land. Inheriting land does not make it more likely that men will be farmers. We find 
no significant effects of inheriting a house. Other (non-land, non-housing) forms of inheritance 
are associated with lower probabilities of an adult being in agricultural self-employment. This 
effect is found in both rural and urban areas, though it is stronger for rural areas (Table 7).  
Analogous results for non-farm occupations are found in Table 8. For rural men, having a 
father in the rural non-farm sector enhances the probability of being in that sector.  On the other 
hand, having a mother who farms or whose occupation is ‘other’ significantly reduces that 
likelihood for rural men. A mother in the non-farm sector significantly enhances the probability 
of an adult working in the non-farm sector, although not for rural women. Higher own schooling 
increases the probability for men (and it is a larger effect for men in rural areas) but not for 
women. Fathers’ schooling has no influence, while mothers’ formal education is positively 
associated with rural men’s off-farm work.   
We find no evidence that inheriting land has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
doing non-farm activities (Table 8) (although, as we will see, this changes when we allow land to 
be endogenous). However, inheritance of other (non-land, non-housing) assets makes it more 
likely that women overall, and men and women in urban Senegal, will be employed in the non-
farm sector (Table 8).  
A number of effects on geographic mobility—identified by whether an adult lives in the 
same place as his or her parents—are evident in Table 9.  Having a farmer for a father makes a 
child’s mobility more likely in the full sample. The effect is much attenuated and only significant 
at the 10% level for the rural and all male and female samples.  Having a father who worked in 
the non-farm sector has the opposite effect—increasing the likelihood of living in the same 
place, though the effect is only significant for rural areas, and is larger for rural women. A 
mother who was engaged in a non-agricultural activity also has a significant effect on living in 
the same place, but in this case, not for daughters. Children with parents occupied in ‘other’ are 
also more likely to be where their parents resided. Having a father with formal schooling makes 
mobility more likely for urban men; a mother with schooling makes it more likely that rural men 
will live in the same place as their parents. Own formal schooling makes mobility more likely, 
though the effect is only significant for men.  These results underline the fact that the 
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intergenerational occupational mobility discussed in the last section implies geographical 
mobility more often when parents are farmers than when they are in a non-farm activity and 
hence, less likely to have a rural location. 
Inheriting land does not have any significant effect on the probability of moving to a 
location different from where one’s father resided in the sample as a whole (Table 9). However, 
there is a sign that inheriting land actually encourages such mobility for urban women. Inheriting 
a house makes it more likely that a man living in rural areas will have the same residence as his 
parents—in a rather obvious way since the one son who will inherit the house is the one who 
intends to live in it (or already does)—but there are no other significant effects of this form of 
inheritance. Nor are there any significant effects of other (non-land, non-housing) inheritance.  
7. Tests of robustness 
Possibly the effect of inheritance is diluted by including in the sample cell heads whose 
parents are still alive, and cannot (of course) be a source of inheritance. We tested this possibility 
by only including cases where either the father or the mother is dead or both were dead. (Details 
are found in the Statistical Addendum.)  In all three cases, the coefficients and standard errors 
results in Table 3 were very similar. Again we found no significant effect of inheriting land on 
consumption. There were only minor differences for Table 4.23  
We also tested sensitivity to allowing for an interaction effect between inheritance and 
the time since the father died; for those with a dead father, the mean time since death is 22 years 
(the median is 19). It is not clear on a priori grounds what one would expect. The inherited asset 
may have a positive rate of return allowing for capital accumulation, though other factors may 
come into play; for example, there were clearly fewer options to farming for those who inherited 
the land a long time ago. Also, assets (including land) depreciate in value over time. Our tests 
involved simply adding an interaction effect between inheritance and years since the death of the 
father to the preceding regressions.24 For cell consumption per capita, there was a negative 
interaction effect though only amongst urban men, for which the effect was significant at the 5% 
level. The total effect was positive up to about 30 years, though not significant even when the 
                                                            
23  When confined to the sample with the father dead, the positive effect of inheriting a house on consumption 
remained but only in the urban sample. A positive effect of inheriting a house was found for rural areas in the 
sample with the mother dead. The effects of maternal characteristics (sector and education) on the probability of 
being a farmer are stronger when one confines attention to the sample with either parent dead.  
24 If one assumes that the current value per unit of past inheritance is given by f(t)=[(1+r)(1-d)]t (where r is 
the rate of return, d is the depreciation rate and t is the number of years since father’s death) then the function f(t) 
can be approximated by a linear function of t with constant parameters if one takes its first-order Taylor series 
expansion and assumes that r and d are common across all households. However, these are potentially strong 
assumptions, especially the constancy of returns. 
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father died recently. For agricultural self-employment the interaction effect was often positive 
though generally not significant, except for urban men; for non-farm employment the pattern 
switched, with a negative interaction effect, though again not strong. However, allowing for such 
an interaction effect does not change our main findings reported above. 
Yet another variation is to allow for “cross-effects” of inheritance and education of the 
spouse (for example, including the inheritance of a woman's husband in the regression for her 
consumption or economic activity). We found no significant cross-effects of inheritance or 
education on consumption for either men or women. Nor were there any significant effects of a 
husband's inheritance on the wife's sector of work.25 There were signs that a wife's inheritance 
increased the likelihood of men in rural areas being farmers, and made it more likely that urban 
men would be inactive. One significant cross-effect was that having an educated husband made 
mobility more likely for women, as measured by whether she lived in the same village as her 
parents. This was found in both urban and rural areas. 
Another possible concern is that some of our regressors may be considered endogenous. 
The main results on the effects of inheritance on the various dependent variables were found to 
be robust to dropping other potentially endogenous variables, namely own-schooling, being 
fostered as a child and age at first marriage. (The endogeneity concern here is that these variables 
may be jointly determined with land inheritance.) One change of note is that dropping own 
education revealed even weaker effects of parental education on sector of employment. 
Our assumption that past inheritance is exogenous to current living standards might also 
be questioned. Choices about who inherits the land may be influenced by factors that are 
unobserved by us, but observed by the parents or other stakeholders—factors that are also 
correlated with the economic activity and economic welfare of the child on reaching adulthood.  
It may be decided by the family group that one of the sons is best suited to taking charge of the 
family farm on the father’s death. This may reflect a latent interest or ability at farming, revealed 
while growing up. Or it may be that other sons show more aptitude for non-farm work. Parents 
may also have gender preferences in their choices about inheritance and schooling—choices that 
are influenced by both market and non-market parameters.26 Another potential source of 
endogeneity is the fact that children could possibly decline the inheritance, in particular of land, 
                                                            
25 Among those rural women whose husband inherited land, in most cases the husband also had some other 
form of (non-land, non-housing) inheritance (there were only 27 exceptions, comprising women whose husband 
only got some other inheritance). This made it impossible to credibly separate these two forms of spousal 
inheritance for women, so we aggregated them. 
26 For example, using data from the rural Philippines, Estudillo et al. (2001) show how sons are preferred for 
land inheritance, while daughters are preferred for investments in schooling. 
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if taking care of it is not compatible with their preferred activity or if, being themselves 
economically successful, they feel that their siblings have a greater need for it. 
In testing the robustness of our results to treating inheritance as endogenous, the key 
identifying assumption we make is that the death of the father or mother only matters to an 
individual adult’s current economic welfare via inheritance of land or other assets.  It is hard to 
see why parental death sometime in the past would matter to current adult consumption except 
via inheritance and (hence) wealth. Possibly the shock of parental death will have an impact, but 
then we control for a father’s recent death (within the last two years) in all our regressions.  
We can only convincingly treat one inheritance variable as endogenous, solving out other 
endogenous variables.27 We do so for any land, excluding other forms of inheritance. We also 
drop any variables that could be endogenous by the same logic, notably own education. (Parents 
may decide that one son gets the schooling while the other gets the land.) We also drop fostering 
and age at marriage for the same reason.   
The Statistical Addendum gives the first-stage regressions.  Unsurprisingly, the death of 
either parent significantly increased the probability of inheritance, and the coefficients are 
considerably higher for paternal death.  
Table 10 gives the IV estimates, treating land inheritance as endogenous, for each of the 
dependent variables.28 (Note that the estimator is not feasible for the sub-sample for which the 
father is dead.)  Our results on land inheritance are reasonably robust to relaxing the exogeneity 
assumption. In particular, we still find that land inheritance does not convey any significant 
consumption benefit.  
However, we now find that land inheritance tends to encourage a male only shift from 
farm to non-farm work, suggesting that there was a downward bias in the earlier estimates. On 
investigating this effect further we find that it is present for both the sub-samples of men that are 
heads of households and those that are not, but that it is far stronger in size and only statistically 
significant for those who are not household heads. Table 11 gives a split of the results for farm 
and non-farm activities (as well as for the other dependent variables) according to whether or not 
the cell head is also the overall household head.29  The IV coefficients on land inheritance in the 
non-farm regression are  0.133 (s.e.=0.105)  for male heads of household as compared to 0.457 
(s.e.=0.151) for male non-heads. Likewise, the significant negative impact of inheriting land on 
                                                            
27 We tried using death of father and death of mother as two IVs for two inheritance variables (land and other) 
but these did not have sufficient power for credible identification.  
28 For consumption, we also used the treatment effects model (the “treatreg” estimator in STATA) which uses 
full maximum likelihood to estimate the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment on another endogenous 
continuous variable, conditional on two sets of independent variables. This gave very similar results. 
29 No such interaction effects were evident for the other dependent variables in Table 11. 
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being a farmer is only present for non-household heads.   The latter sub-sample tends to be 
comprised of married brothers of household heads. Finally and in line with the above findings, 
land inheritance also makes it significantly more likely that male heads live where their parents 
lived, and less likely for non-heads.  When land inheritance comes without the responsibilities of 
headship it appears to be an important factor in encouraging diversification into non-farm 
activities.   
8. Implications for explaining inequality 
It is clear from these results that bequests can play little role in perpetuating consumption 
inequality. However, other parental characteristics clearly do matter, both directly and via a 
child's characteristics at adulthood, notably education. To quantify the contributions of the 
various additive factors we have identified above, we follow Shorrocks (1982) in identifying the 
contribution of the k’th explanatory variable to total inequality by its share of variance, with 
equal sharing of the interaction terms stemming from correlations amongst the factors. 
(Shorrocks terms this the “natural decomposition” and shows that, under certain conditions, it is 
also relevant to other inequality measures besides the variance.) Following Fields (2003), when 
the “income” variable y is given by its linear regression on a vector x, this gives: 
)var(
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β          (3) 
And xik is the k’th predictor (xim can be taken to be an error term, with βm=1). Thus the 
contribution of the k’th explanatory variable to inequality in y is simply the product of the partial 
regression coefficient of y on kx  (holding all other variables constant) with the total regression 
coefficient of kx  on y (holding nothing else constant).  Note that the decomposition is 
unchanged if y is the log of income (Fields, 2003).   
Table 12 presents decompositions of consumption inequality implied by the regressions 
in Table 4. As expected, the inheritance variables (land, housing or other assets) contribute very 
little. Far more important to inequality than these forms of inheritance is “own schooling,” which 
contributes 9% to overall consumption inequality (almost one fifth of the explained component) 
and 11% in urban Senegal.  The share is even higher for women but is much lower in rural areas. 
The father’s sector of employment is important, with the incidence of non-farm parental work 
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contributing almost 6%, while the incidence of farm employment amongst fathers reduced 
inequality. Demographics, especially cell size and the proportion of adults, also emerge as large 
contributors to inequality, especially in rural areas. In the national sample, almost half of the 
explained inequality is attributable to rural-urban location. 
9. Conclusions 
 We find evidence of significant intergenerational linkages in this setting. This is evident 
in the correlations between parents’ and children’s sectors of occupation, which persist on adding 
controls for heterogeneity in other respects. Nonetheless, there is still considerable 
intergenerational mobility, both across sectors and residentially, primarily associated with the 
transition from farm to non-farm activities. Only one third of the sons of farmers stayed in 
farming. Father-son mobility between farm and non-farm sectors is high in Senegal, relative to 
other developing countries for which comparable estimates are available. And adult women in 
our sample are far more economically active than were their mothers, although there is still less 
occupational mobility for women. 
Our results suggest that gender plays an important role. There is consumption inequality 
between men and women, though this is largely accountable to differences in observable factors 
such as education. The intergenerational linkages through the mother appear to be stronger than 
through the father, including on the son’s economic activity.  Educated mothers are more likely 
to have sons in the non-farm sector. While women with formal schooling are no more likely to 
be in non-farm employment and (slightly) more likely to be farmers, it is their sons who are more 
likely to find their way into the non-farm sector.   
Assuming conditional exogeneity of inheritance (and with a wide range of controls), 
inheriting the land makes it more likely that a woman will stay a farmer, but this is not so for 
men. Inheriting other (non-land, non-housing) assets appears to strongly help get urban women 
into non-farm work, but the effect is less significant and smaller for urban men and not present in 
rural areas. However, endogeneity bias might partly account for those results. When we allow for 
the possible endogeneity of land inheritance by assuming that the death of a parent only matters 
via inheritance (though allowing for the short-term shock of parental death) we find evidence 
that land inheritance does play a role in facilitating diversification from farm into non-farm 
activities, although this is only present for men who do not also inherit the responsibilities of 
being the overall head of the household. The potential wealth effect of inheritance on activity 
choice seems to be inhibited by the obligations attendant to household headship. 
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 On average, inheriting the land or house brings no significant gain to an adult’s 
consumption. It appears that intra-household allocation across generations comes fairly close to 
equalizing consumption between otherwise identical individuals, only one of whom takes on the 
responsibility for the family’s land and housing assets. However, we find that there are 
significant gains from inheriting other (non-land and non-housing) assets. In particular, formal 
schooling appears to yield much higher returns. 
 In short, while intergenerational linkages clearly matter, there still appears to be 
considerable intergenerational mobility in this setting. Inheritance of land or housing contributes 
very little to overall inequality, and does not appear to be an important channel for enhancing 
economic efficiency through transfers of ownership. Non-land inheritance, schooling and 
parental characteristics (especially the mother’s) appear to play a far more important role.  
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Table 1: Inheritance, by gender 
 
Among individual heads 
of cells whose father or 
mother is dead 
Men Women All t-test of the 
difference 
(women-men) 
Father has left any form 
of inheritance 
75.34%   
(987) 
68.26%  
(974) 
71.65% -4.12 
Father has transmitted 
land to this person 
40.61%   
(588) 
24.74% 
(410) 
32.14% -9.58 
Mother has left any form 
of inheritance 
21.23% 
(173) 
22.49% 
(190) 
21.87% 0.62 
Mother has transmitted 
land to this person 
2.62 
(38) 
1.75% 
(29) 
2.16% -1.67 
  Note: number of observations in brackets. 
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Table 2: Sectoral occupational mobility across generations for men and women 
No. observations 
(% of all individuals) 
Men Women 
Farm Non-farm Inactive Other Total Farm Non-farm Inactive Other Total 
Father’s occupation           
Farm 219 314 28 76 637 229 276 267 121 893 
 (12.41) (17.79) (1.59) (4.31) (36.09) (9.74) (11.73) (11.35) (5.14) (37.97) 
Non-farm 53 421 53 27 554 49 403 358 19 829 
 (3.00) (23.85) (3.00) (1.53) (31.39) (2.08) (17.13) (15.22) (0.81) (35.25) 
Inactive 175 279 50 40 544 107 183 280 41 611 
 (9.92) (15.81) (2.83) (2.27) (30.82) (4.55) (7.78) (11.90) (1.74) (25.98) 
Other 1 10 5 14 30 1 6 6 6 19 
 (0.06) (0.57) (0.28) (0.79) (1.70) (0.04) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.81) 
Total 448 1,024 136 157 1,765 386 868 911 187 2,352 
 (25.38) (58.02) (7.71) (8.90) (100.00) (16.41) (36.90) (38.73) (7.95) (100.00) 
Cramer’s V     0.204     0.194 
Odds-ratio (farm and 
non-farm only)     
5.54 
    
6.82 
Mother’s occupation           
Farm 154 134 13 50 351 187 173 89 104 553 
 (8.67) (7.54) (0.73) (2.81) (19.75) (7.97) (7.37) (3.79) (4.43) (23.56) 
Non-farm 19 208 20 13 260 22 218 155 14 409 
 (1.07) (11.71) (1.13) (0.73) (14.63) (0.94) (9.29) (6.60) (0.60) (17.43) 
Inactive 268 684 103 58 1,113 172 476 652 53 1,353 
 (15.08) (38.49) (5.80) (3.26) (62.63) (7.33) (20.28) (27.78) (2.26) (57.65) 
Other 5 7 2 39 53 4 6 5 17 32 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.11) (2.19) (2.98) (0.17) (0.26) (0.21) (0.72) (1.36) 
Total 446 1,033 138 160 1,777 385 873 901 188 2,347 
 (25.10) (58.13) (7.77) (9.00) (100.00) (16.40) (37.20) (38.39) (8.01) (100.00) 
Cramer’s V     0.289     0.265 
Odds-ratio (farm 
andnon-farm only)     
12.59 
    
10.71 
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Table 3: Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and 
without controls 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 No controls 
Rural location 
and department 
dummies 
As in (2) + controls for 
individual and household 
characteristics 
        
Inherited land -0.324*** -0.0978** -0.0740* 
 (0.0541) (0.0430) (0.0449) 
Inherited house 0.196*** 0.0733** 0.0736** 
 (0.0438) (0.0361) (0.0368) 
Other inheritance 0.0234 0.0889** 0.0642 
 (0.0494) (0.0424) (0.0419) 
Constant 12.53*** 13.01*** 12.95*** 
 (0.0276) (0.247) (0.285) 
Observations 4,339 4,339 3,392 
R2 0.014 0.325 0.465 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.Controls included in the regression reported in column 3 are: rural location, the cell head’s gender, age and 
age squared, age at first marriage, whether the first born of a given gender among siblings with the same mother and 
same father, whether the first born among all children with the same mother and father, whether the first born sibling 
from the same mother and father is a boy, number of brothers from the same father and mother, number of brothers 
from the same father and same mother only, and the same three variables for sisters, ethnic group, whether Muslim 
relative to other religions, whether has some formal education, whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered 
under two years of age; parent’s characteristics (education, farm, non-farm or other occupation, last place of 
residence, whether the father died in the last two years, whether the mother died in the last two years); log household 
size, log cell size, cell’s share of adults and share of children age 5 and under and  regional (department) dummies. 
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Table 4: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita 
 
  
(1)  
Full sample 
(2)  
Rural 
(3)  
Urban 
(4)  
Men 
(5)  
Women 
Male -0.00550 -0.0400 0.0249 -- -- 
 (0.0409) (0.0614) (0.0564)   
Age -0.00281 -0.00575 0.00327 0.00602 -0.0148* 
 (0.00623) (0.00755) (0.00993) (0.0101) (0.00829) 
Age squared -2.31e-06 1.56e-06 -2.95e-05 -9.40e-05 0.000139 
 (6.24e-05) (7.56e-05) (9.89e-05) (9.50e-05) (8.74e-05) 
Muslim 0.0649 -0.0934 0.123 0.0975 0.0409 
 (0.0968) (0.199) (0.106) (0.128) (0.105) 
Serere ethnicity -0.191*** -0.209* -0.181*** -0.259*** -0.131* 
 (0.0630) (0.122) (0.0685) (0.0845) (0.0697) 
Poular ethnicity -0.0475 0.0687 -0.104 -0.0828 -0.0139 
 (0.0521) (0.0852) (0.0646) (0.0682) (0.0542) 
Diola ethnicity -0.158 -0.163 -0.111 0.0259 -0.264*** 
 (0.0995) (0.373) (0.102) (0.154) (0.0978) 
Mandingue ethnicity -0.110 0.152 -0.256*** -0.175* -0.0590 
 (0.0867) (0.159) (0.0804) (0.102) (0.0957) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.0853 0.0782 -0.104 -0.171 -0.00624 
 (0.127) (0.235) (0.167) (0.175) (0.146) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.443** -0.585 -0.390** -0.181 -0.554*** 
 (0.181) (0.380) (0.193) (0.217) (0.200) 
Other ethnicity -0.0103 0.152 -0.128 0.0880 -0.101 
 (0.108) (0.180) (0.115) (0.142) (0.116) 
Brothers same father -0.000649 -0.0113 0.00398 0.000877 -0.00205 
 (0.00782) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0135) (0.00969) 
Brothers same parents 0.000895 0.00962 -0.00638 0.0159 -0.0134 
 (0.00940) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0117) 
Sisters same father 0.0114 0.0201* 0.00548 0.00171 0.0200** 
 (0.00794) (0.0121) (0.0107) (0.0139) (0.00980) 
Sisters same parents 0.0195** 0.0285** 0.0157 0.0123 0.0306*** 
 (0.00908) (0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0117) 
Brothers same mother 0.0459** 0.0325 0.0496** 0.0753*** 0.0271 
 (0.0180) (0.0317) (0.0219) (0.0257) (0.0230) 
Sisters same mother -0.0287 -0.0246 -0.0251 -0.0374 -0.0246 
 (0.0206) (0.0270) (0.0294) (0.0291) (0.0287) 
First same gender 0.00358 0.0408 -0.0323 -0.00374 0.0180 
 (0.0321) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0604) (0.0452) 
First of siblings 0.0122 -0.0154 0.0463 -0.0337 0.0749 
 (0.0382) (0.0521) (0.0538) (0.0661) (0.0627) 
First born is male 0.0561* 0.106** -0.0113 0.0334 0.0931** 
 (0.0310) (0.0435) (0.0413) (0.0628) (0.0415) 
Father died recently -0.0188 -0.00483 -0.0176 0.0161 -0.0428 
 (0.0534) (0.0760) (0.0740) (0.100) (0.0585) 
Father in farming 0.0932** 0.0567 0.123* 0.0672 0.0986** 
 (0.0418) (0.0534) (0.0660) (0.0573) (0.0490) 
Mother in farm -0.0738 -0.0967 0.00610 -0.0922 -0.0672 
 (0.0449) (0.0589) (0.0669) (0.0619) (0.0538) 
Father in non-farm 0.168*** 0.154** 0.177*** 0.198*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0701) (0.0560) (0.0609) (0.0511) 
Mother in non-farm -0.118*** -0.0516 -0.136** -0.164** -0.0793 
 (0.0441) (0.0686) (0.0574) (0.0696) (0.0525) 
32 
 
Father in ‘other’ 0.400*** 0.139 0.573** 0.422** 0.369 
 (0.151) (0.181) (0.250) (0.205) (0.250) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.223** -0.184* 0.0543 -0.186 -0.313* 
 (0.0960) (0.104) (0.255) (0.128) (0.161) 
Father’s schooling 0.0744 -0.0656 0.0984* 0.152* 0.0356 
 (0.0493) (0.0905) (0.0561) (0.0802) (0.0592) 
Mother’s schooling 0.165*** 0.0987 0.228*** 0.0371 0.245*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0959) (0.0816) (0.0879) (0.0893) 
Father rural 0.00560 -0.0166 -0.0160 0.0498 -0.0292 
 (0.0510) (0.0799) (0.0667) (0.0911) (0.0584) 
Mother rural -0.0659 -0.0394 -0.0707 -0.114 -0.0274 
 (0.0515) (0.0821) (0.0677) (0.0909) (0.0583) 
Log hh size -0.305*** -0.289*** -0.315*** -0.286*** -0.327*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0626) (0.0416) (0.0487) (0.0415) 
Log cell size -0.112*** -0.170*** -0.100*** -0.141*** -0.0553 
 (0.0271) (0.0397) (0.0366) (0.0505) (0.0438) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.194** -0.224* -0.126 -0.349* -0.159 
 (0.0962) (0.132) (0.143) (0.202) (0.113) 
Share of cell adults 0.438*** 0.245** 0.553*** 0.381*** 0.478*** 
 (0.0769) (0.115) (0.105) (0.145) (0.0997) 
Has formal schooling 0.274*** 0.160** 0.322*** 0.229*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0638) (0.0438) (0.0535) (0.0461) 
Fostered 0.102** 0.126* 0.0987 0.159** 0.0256 
 (0.0521) (0.0767) (0.0714) (0.0785) (0.0648) 
Fostered young -0.00118 -0.0452 -0.00601 -0.150 0.117 
 (0.0669) (0.103) (0.0904) (0.118) (0.0828) 
Age at first marriage -7.50e-05 0.00329 -0.00165 -0.00315 0.00450 
 (0.00276) (0.00419) (0.00362) (0.00403) (0.00379) 
Inherited land -0.0740* -0.0266 -0.0897 -0.102 -0.0366 
 (0.0449) (0.0691) (0.0586) (0.0622) (0.0539) 
Inherited house 0.0736** 0.0601 0.0862* 0.0617 0.0883* 
 (0.0368) (0.0614) (0.0448) (0.0535) (0.0452) 
Other inheritance 0.0642 0.0330 0.114* 0.159*** -0.0186 
 (0.0419) (0.0558) (0.0614) (0.0566) (0.0508) 
Rural -0.298*** -- -- -0.322*** -0.291*** 
 (0.0607)   (0.0842) (0.0653) 
Constant 12.95*** 13.41*** 12.46*** 13.69*** 13.52*** 
 (0.285) (0.484) (0.326) (0.512) (0.366) 
Observations 3,392 1,756 1,636 1,479 1,913 
R2 0.465 0.279 0.415 0.471 0.463 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the same father, 
same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies.  The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, 
all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’, share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table 5: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita by gender and rural/urban 
residence 
  (1) Rural  (2) Rural  (3) Urban (4) Urban 
 men women men women 
Age -0.0110 -0.00852 0.0310** -0.0216 
 (0.0138) (0.00866) (0.0148) (0.0134) 
Age squared 2.80e-05 5.68e-05 -0.000290** 0.000245* 
 (0.000129) (8.85e-05) (0.000140) (0.000140) 
Muslim -0.261 -0.00343 0.269* 0.0682 
 (0.232) (0.196) (0.150) (0.127) 
Serere ethnicity -0.186 -0.237** -0.271*** -0.0591 
 (0.161) (0.120) (0.0938) (0.0925) 
Poular ethnicity 0.0758 0.0565 -0.168* -0.0575 
 (0.103) (0.0914) (0.0948) (0.0680) 
Diola ethnicity 0.308 -0.394 0.0561 -0.193* 
 (0.485) (0.391) (0.167) (0.104) 
Mandingue ethnicity 0.238 0.126 -0.414*** -0.160* 
 (0.164) (0.184) (0.126) (0.0863) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.0774 0.285 -0.155 -0.0299 
 (0.322) (0.287) (0.239) (0.171) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.481 -0.678* 0.00144 -0.477** 
 (0.408) (0.383) (0.262) (0.225) 
Other ethnicity 0.326 0.0227 0.0234 -0.220* 
 (0.209) (0.198) (0.166) (0.129) 
Brothers same father -0.0216 0.00527 0.0154 -0.0113 
 (0.0191) (0.0138) (0.0191) (0.0146) 
Brothers same parents 0.0341 -0.0161 0.00828 -0.0173 
 (0.0233) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0172) 
Sisters same father 0.0134 0.0215 -0.00529 0.0208 
 (0.0199) (0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0134) 
Sisters same parents 0.00783 0.0522*** 0.00588 0.0244 
 (0.0217) (0.0173) (0.0188) (0.0162) 
Brothers same mother 0.0401 0.0185 0.0845*** 0.0224 
 (0.0509) (0.0392) (0.0296) (0.0299) 
Sisters same mother 0.0419 -0.0602** -0.0728** 0.00366 
 (0.0686) (0.0243) (0.0288) (0.0467) 
First same gender 0.0263 0.0615 0.0461 -0.0491 
 (0.0822) (0.0630) (0.0864) (0.0636) 
First of siblings -0.0861 0.0691 -0.0309 0.0769 
 (0.0942) (0.0897) (0.0964) (0.0866) 
First born is male 0.106 0.152*** 0.00555 -0.00539 
 (0.0886) (0.0581) (0.0894) (0.0599) 
Father died recently 0.0760 -0.0227 -0.00617 -0.0561 
 (0.140) (0.0920) (0.153) (0.0752) 
Father in farming -0.0529 0.145** 0.239*** 0.00457 
 (0.0754) (0.0607) (0.0916) (0.0818) 
Mother in farm -0.0828 -0.0999 -0.0873 0.0945 
 (0.0856) (0.0651) (0.0891) (0.0885) 
Father in non-farm 0.0849 0.206** 0.279*** 0.0802 
 (0.0947) (0.0875) (0.0795) (0.0697) 
Mother in non-farm -0.134 0.0652 -0.169* -0.124* 
 (0.101) (0.0902) (0.0917) (0.0668) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.147 0.0268 0.586* 0.398 
 (0.240) (0.232) (0.322) (0.386) 
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Mother in ‘other’ -0.119 -0.287 0.401 0.0399 
 (0.136) (0.209) (0.301) (0.421) 
Father’s schooling -0.242* 0.121 0.230** 0.0305 
 (0.142) (0.112) (0.0948) (0.0680) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0382 0.109 0.0969 0.292*** 
 (0.158) (0.143) (0.117) (0.111) 
Father rural -0.0790 0.00103 -0.0576 -0.0394 
 (0.159) (0.0894) (0.110) (0.0822) 
Mother rural -0.167 0.0439 -0.0132 -0.0626 
 (0.165) (0.0870) (0.112) (0.0845) 
Log hh size -0.207** -0.359*** -0.332*** -0.310*** 
 (0.0872) (0.0636) (0.0537) (0.0557) 
Log cell size -0.255*** -0.0863 -0.0880 -0.0756 
 (0.0776) (0.0616) (0.0664) (0.0606) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.631** -0.0906 0.123 -0.254 
 (0.286) (0.152) (0.303) (0.173) 
Share of cell adults 0.104 0.309** 0.602*** 0.503*** 
 (0.218) (0.137) (0.196) (0.148) 
Has formal schooling 0.111 0.142 0.278*** 0.359*** 
 (0.0876) (0.0871) (0.0704) (0.0552) 
Fostered 0.209* 0.0131 0.181 0.0178 
 (0.112) (0.0953) (0.118) (0.0861) 
Fostered young -0.299 0.108 -0.112 0.128 
 (0.182) (0.118) (0.157) (0.114) 
Age at first marriage 0.00241 0.00461 -0.00861 0.00613 
 (0.00641) (0.00586) (0.00552) (0.00501) 
Inherited land -0.0875 0.0363 -0.127 -0.0600 
 (0.0898) (0.0845) (0.0921) (0.0697) 
Inherited house 0.0298 0.0785 0.105 0.100* 
 (0.0799) (0.0768) (0.0752) (0.0576) 
Other inheritance 0.176** -0.100 0.166* 0.0458 
 (0.0727) (0.0636) (0.0888) (0.0786) 
Constant 14.28*** 12.44*** 11.78*** 13.20*** 
 (0.811) (0.534) (0.530) (0.384) 
Observations 758 998 721 915 
R2 0.292 0.309 0.419 0.413 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of 
the same father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies.  The reference 
variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no 
and non-formal schooling. 
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Table 6: Returns to log per capita consumption of parental characteristics 
 
 Formal schooling 
 Neither Father yes/mother no Father no/mother yes Both 
Same sector     
      Both farm 0.019 0.093 0.184 0.258 
      Both non-farm 0.050 0.124 0.215 0.289 
Mixed sectors     
      Father farm/ 
      mother non-farm -0.025 0.049 0.140 0.214 
      Father non-farm/ 
      mother farm 0.094 0.168 0.259 0.333 
Note: Based on the coefficients estimated for total log consumption per capita given in Table 4, Column 1. 
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Table 7: Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on agricultural employment   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Rural Urban Men Women Rural men 
Rural 
women Urban men 
Urban 
women 
                    
Father in farming 0.0169 0.0141 0.00740 0.0120 0.0198 -0.00175 0.0353 0.0218 -0.00463 
 (0.0168) (0.0324) (0.0104) (0.0271) (0.0191) (0.0485) (0.0409) (0.0196) (0.00294) 
Mother in farm 0.0770*** 0.116*** 0.0175 0.112*** 0.0567** 0.192*** 0.0692 -0.0209** 0.0500 
 (0.0240) (0.0396) (0.0185) (0.0377) (0.0241) (0.0588) (0.0426) (0.00932) (0.0313) 
Father in non-farm -0.0235 -0.0765* -0.00121 -0.0523 -0.0213 -0.180*** -0.0226 0.00792 -0.0109 
 (0.0198) (0.0450) (0.0103) (0.0325) (0.0243) (0.0653) (0.0634) (0.0152) (0.00724) 
Mother in non-farm -0.0541*** -0.159*** -0.00426 -0.105*** -0.0262 -0.237*** -0.106* -0.0129 -0.000300 
 (0.0208) (0.0483) (0.00923) (0.0325) (0.0237) (0.0679) (0.0588) (0.0119) (0.00306) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.112*** -0.244*** -- -0.142*** -- -0.289** -- -- -- 
 (0.0239) (0.0827)  (0.0451)  (0.118)    
Mother in ‘other’ -0.104*** -0.221*** -- -0.150*** -0.0773*** -0.276*** -0.174*** -- -- 
 (0.0177) (0.0490)  (0.0276) (0.0184) (0.0789) (0.0578)   
Father’s schooling 0.0273 0.0795 -0.00209 0.0200 0.0103 0.0148 0.0803 0.00639 -0.000983 
 (0.0301) (0.0819) (0.00978) (0.0516) (0.0321) (0.121) (0.103) (0.0194) (0.00279) 
Mother’s schooling -0.0147 -0.0963 0.00123 -0.0849* 0.0356 -0.145 -0.0947 -0.0307*** 0.0353 
 (0.0384) (0.0776) (0.0159) (0.0454) (0.0530) (0.107) (0.0872) (0.00879) (0.0275) 
Own schooling -0.0203 -0.0673 -0.00524 -0.0656** 0.0354 -0.0902 0.0136 -0.0542*** 0.00835* 
 (0.0181) (0.0451) (0.00802) (0.0282) (0.0243) (0.0633) (0.0621) (0.0170) (0.00474) 
Inherited land 0.0557** 0.0801* 0.00998 0.00373 0.114*** -0.00998 0.171*** 0.00312 0.0118 
 (0.0218) (0.0412) (0.0128) (0.0304) (0.0343) (0.0571) (0.0643) (0.0158) (0.0100) 
Inherited house 0.00825 0.0128 0.0148 0.00210 0.0153 -0.0298 0.0769 0.0196 -0.000619 
 (0.0180) (0.0371) (0.0117) (0.0273) (0.0218) (0.0515) (0.0528) (0.0144) (0.00375) 
Inherited other -0.0404** -0.0669* -0.0157** -0.0402 -0.0255 -0.0519 -0.0438 -0.0142 -0.00492* 
 (0.0160) (0.0343) (0.00723) (0.0260) (0.0186) (0.0490) (0.0442) (0.0114) (0.00270) 
          
Observations 3,407 1,761 1,565 1,479 1,843 752 957 675 725 
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.222 0.240 0.318 0.348 0.234 0.285 0.314 0.433 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The regressions 
include controls listed in Table 3 notes. The ‘other’ occupation drops out of the urban regressions as it is found only in rural areas. 
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Table 8: Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on non-agricultural employment   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Rural Urban Men Women Rural men 
Rural 
women 
Urban 
men 
Urban 
women 
                    
Father in farming 0.0122 -0.00256 0.0333 0.0355 -0.00763 0.0202 -0.0255 0.0330 0.0430 
 (0.0273) (0.0301) (0.0381) (0.0373) (0.0339) (0.0469) (0.0340) (0.0411) (0.0602) 
Mother in farm -0.0350 -0.0388 0.0275 -0.131*** 0.0354 -0.148*** 0.0245 -0.0146 0.0493 
 (0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0464) (0.0448) (0.0378) (0.0497) (0.0368) (0.0581) (0.0686) 
Father in non-farm 0.0377 0.106** -0.00258 0.0979** 0.00573 0.199** 0.0636 0.0383 -0.0144 
 (0.0283) (0.0440) (0.0334) (0.0429) (0.0366) (0.0774) (0.0559) (0.0393) (0.0506) 
Mother in non-farm 0.140*** 0.157*** 0.133*** 0.168*** 0.128*** 0.222** 0.0961 0.103*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0544) (0.0296) (0.0482) (0.0379) (0.0899) (0.0631) (0.0328) (0.0455) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.111 0.0334 -0.201 -0.0914 -0.134 0.106 -- -0.398* -0.0866 
 (0.113) (0.122) (0.172) (0.175) (0.108) (0.152)  (0.214) (0.188) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.201*** -0.173*** 0.0144 -0.308*** 0.0325 -0.270*** 0.0117 -0.129 0.160 
 (0.0761) (0.0432) (0.250) (0.107) (0.145) (0.0607) (0.112) (0.238) (0.312) 
Father’s schooling -0.0303 -0.0765 0.0245 -0.0107 -0.0350 -0.0377 -0.0619 0.0401 -0.000904 
 (0.0326) (0.0549) (0.0348) (0.0603) (0.0384) (0.118) (0.0617) (0.0445) (0.0493) 
Mother’s schooling -0.00922 0.172* -0.0652 0.0655 -0.0489 0.284** 0.100 -0.0215 -0.0856 
 (0.0476) (0.0889) (0.0530) (0.0835) (0.0510) (0.124) (0.106) (0.0774) (0.0683) 
Own schooling 0.0560** 0.0919** 0.0375 0.166*** 0.00599 0.278*** 0.0378 0.118*** -0.0172 
 (0.0258) (0.0437) (0.0290) (0.0364) (0.0321) (0.0682) (0.0504) (0.0350) (0.0412) 
Inherited land -0.0323 -0.0161 0.00446 0.00839 -0.0209 0.0656 -0.0615 -0.0307 0.0576 
 (0.0305) (0.0359) (0.0434) (0.0429) (0.0397) (0.0566) (0.0409) (0.0494) (0.0604) 
Inherited house 0.0225 -0.00491 0.0173 -0.00856 0.0324 -0.0278 0.0152 -0.0163 0.0285 
 (0.0269) (0.0344) (0.0331) (0.0382) (0.0335) (0.0528) (0.0441) (0.0375) (0.0453) 
Inherited other 0.0464* 0.00324 0.121*** 0.0170 0.0855** -0.0120 0.0297 0.0752** 0.174*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0316) (0.0335) (0.0362) (0.0354) (0.0467) (0.0398) (0.0341) (0.0499) 
          
Observations 3,385 1,732 1,646 1,479 1,906 741 974 718 921 
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.154 0.156 0.262 0.175 0.233 0.148 0.148 0.141 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The 
regressions include controls listed in Table 3 notes.  
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Table 9: Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on living in the same residence   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Rural Urban Men Women Rural men 
Rural 
women Urban men 
Urban 
women 
                    
Father in farming -0.0730*** -0.0541* -0.0448 -0.0630* -0.0619* -0.0296 -0.0483 -0.0412 -0.0643 
 (0.0259) (0.0325) (0.0522) (0.0359) (0.0339) (0.0200) (0.0458) (0.0774) (0.0667) 
Mother in farm -0.00612 0.00221 0.000699 0.0239 -0.0299 0.0316* -0.0441 0.00264 0.0229 
 (0.0289) (0.0352) (0.0649) (0.0397) (0.0369) (0.0189) (0.0480) (0.104) (0.0853) 
Father in non-farm 0.0755** 0.125*** 0.0438 0.0634* 0.0693* 0.0536*** 0.182*** 0.0214 0.0451 
 (0.0298) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0378) (0.0389) (0.0170) (0.0700) (0.0654) (0.0535) 
Mother in non-farm 0.120*** 0.150*** 0.105*** 0.121*** 0.0681* 0.0567*** 0.123 0.175** 0.0676 
 (0.0297) (0.0441) (0.0398) (0.0385) (0.0378) (0.0162) (0.0817) (0.0723) (0.0474) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.192** -- 0.0547 0.0656 0.268** -- -- -0.117 0.119 
 (0.0878)  (0.149) (0.103) (0.128)   (0.213) (0.187) 
Mother in ‘other’ 0.248*** 0.131* 0.322** 0.170** 0.249** 0.0461** 0.144 0.116 0.280 
 (0.0585) (0.0747) (0.127) (0.0693) (0.108) (0.0227) (0.160) (0.165) (0.187) 
Father’s schooling -0.0282 0.0846 -0.0667* -0.0644 -0.0321 0.0248 0.0326 -0.120** -0.0278 
 (0.0360) (0.0693) (0.0393) (0.0514) (0.0440) (0.0410) (0.113) (0.0606) (0.0497) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0740 0.146** -0.0159 0.0781 0.0249 0.0509*** 0.183 0.0182 -0.0531 
 (0.0452) (0.0608) (0.0554) (0.0654) (0.0583) (0.0171) (0.113) (0.119) (0.0625) 
Own schooling -0.0457* -0.0606 -0.0698** -0.0762** -0.00579 -0.105** 0.0352 -0.107* -0.0672 
 (0.0277) (0.0536) (0.0343) (0.0383) (0.0356) (0.0504) (0.0705) (0.0581) (0.0436) 
Inherited land -0.0213 0.0288 -0.0948** 0.0221 -0.0810** 0.0349 0.0244 -0.0574 -0.120** 
 (0.0283) (0.0387) (0.0419) (0.0383) (0.0389) (0.0233) (0.0613) (0.0703) (0.0556) 
Inherited house 0.0459* 0.00788 0.0469 0.0562* 0.0250 0.0408* -0.0449 0.0618 0.0291 
 (0.0245) (0.0365) (0.0349) (0.0321) (0.0328) (0.0227) (0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0438) 
Inherited other 0.0170 0.0239 0.000188 0.0242 -0.0220 0.0258 -0.00785 0.0282 -0.0218 
 (0.0257) (0.0351) (0.0422) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0211) (0.0537) (0.0692) (0.0537) 
          
Observations 3,407 1,736 1,646 1,436 1,921 701 994 702 921 
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.279 0.330 0.346 0.109 0.366 0.183 0.426 0.309 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The regressions include 
controls listed in Table 3 notes.
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Table 10: IV estimates for all dependent variables for the total, men only and women only samples. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Log per cap expenditures Farm employment Non-farm Same residence as parents 
 All Men Women All Men  Women All Men Women All Men Women 
             
Inherited land 0.119 0.0475 0.214 -0.0394 -0.159** 0.0510 0.124** 0.178** 0.0650 0.0373 0.0756 -0.0316 
 (0.110) (0.151) (0.164) (0.0449) (0.0714) (0.0602) (0.0611) (0.0856) (0.0914) (0.0614) (0.0751) (0.0934) 
Father in farming 0.0849** 0.0537 0.0955** 0.0103 0.00758 0.0167 0.0192 0.0364 0.000268 -0.0589*** -0.0404* -0.0636** 
 (0.0404) (0.0568) (0.0474) (0.0195) (0.0289) (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0209) (0.0239) (0.0304) 
Mother in farming -0.0811* -0.0840 -0.0936* 0.0965*** 0.113*** 0.0791*** -0.0333 -0.105*** 0.0221 -0.00340 0.0230 -0.0235 
 (0.0440) (0.0631) (0.0523) (0.0248) (0.0346) (0.0285) (0.0239) (0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0239) (0.0280) (0.0328) 
Father in non-farm 0.210*** 0.226*** 0.181*** -0.0217 -0.0651** -0.0135 0.0575** 0.122*** 0.0241 0.0668*** 0.0552* 0.0648* 
 (0.0442) (0.0626) (0.0547) (0.0172) (0.0291) (0.0201) (0.0238) (0.0359) (0.0326) (0.0253) (0.0317) (0.0354) 
Mother in non-farm -0.0980** -0.135** -0.0678 -0.0285* -0.0695** -0.0235 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.0609* 
 (0.0436) (0.0679) (0.0533) (0.0157) (0.0283) (0.0185) (0.0247) (0.0372) (0.0336) (0.0256) (0.0327) (0.0346) 
Father’s schooling 0.170*** 0.263*** 0.129** 0.0138 0.0109 0.00273 -0.0175 0.00455 -0.0240 -0.0114 -0.0430 -0.00684 
 (0.0503) (0.0784) (0.0610) (0.0152) (0.0277) (0.0177) (0.0262) (0.0395) (0.0357) (0.0296) (0.0383) (0.0381) 
Mother’s schooling 0.193*** 0.0571 0.278*** 0.00894 -0.0399 0.0293 -0.0210 0.0420 -0.0618 0.0543 0.0764 0.0140 
 (0.0638) (0.0974) (0.0863) (0.0248) (0.0432) (0.0264) (0.0373) (0.0607) (0.0453) (0.0361) (0.0503) (0.0492) 
Constant 13.73*** 12.97*** 13.79*** 0.149 0.789*** 0.537*** 0.386** 0.0374 0.201 0.608*** 0.623*** 0.752*** 
 (0.308) (0.412) (0.363) (0.197) (0.161) (0.148) (0.197) (0.179) (0.135) (0.135) (0.210) (0.228) 
Observations 3,571 1,554 2,017 3,587 1,561 2,026 3,587 1,561 2,026 3,587 1,561 2,026 
R2 0.449 0.461 0.437 0.286 0.306 0.326 0.242 0.278 0.212 0.218 0.393 0.147 
Notes: Linear IV coefficients for (4)-(12). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions exclude own 
education, whether fostered and age at first marriage; other controls are as listed in Table 3 notes. 
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Table 11: IV estimates for all dependent variables for the sample of men only 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log expenditure per capita Farm employment Non-farm employment Same residence as parents 
 Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads 
         
Inherited land 0.168 -0.307 -0.127 -0.283** 0.133 0.457*** 0.224** -0.200* 
 (0.200) (0.261) (0.0896) (0.115) (0.105) (0.151) (0.107) (0.111) 
Father in farming 0.0950 -0.154 0.00702 -0.0133 0.0278 0.115 -0.0504* -0.0463 
 (0.0654) (0.119) (0.0306) (0.0650) (0.0330) (0.0808) (0.0275) (0.0566) 
Mother in farming -0.137** 0.272* 0.0512 0.305*** -0.0676* -0.210** 0.0297 0.0134 
 (0.0698) (0.146) (0.0351) (0.0861) (0.0378) (0.0985) (0.0314) (0.0744) 
Father in non-farm 0.309*** -0.0705 -0.0717** -0.0784 0.0907** 0.330*** 0.0483 0.0387 
 (0.0716) (0.146) (0.0321) (0.0612) (0.0391) (0.0885) (0.0378) (0.0641) 
Mother in non-farm -0.105 -0.0622 -0.0803** -0.0459 0.128*** 0.0409 0.112** 0.119** 
 (0.0828) (0.110) (0.0353) (0.0451) (0.0440) (0.0699) (0.0435) (0.0464) 
Father’s schooling 0.331*** 0.0554 0.0423 -0.0976* -0.00891 0.0890 -0.0566 -0.0118 
 (0.0991) (0.119) (0.0329) (0.0512) (0.0451) (0.0939) (0.0501) (0.0616) 
Mother’s schooling -0.0147 0.258* -0.0658 -0.000177 0.0688 -0.00361 0.0863 -0.00846 
 (0.122) (0.153) (0.0504) (0.0590) (0.0662) (0.116) (0.0678) (0.0717) 
Constant 13.73*** 13.26*** 0.199 -0.245 0.431 0.110 0.938*** 0.931*** 
 (0.483) (0.856) (0.245) (0.361) (0.278) (0.574) (0.209) (0.328) 
Observations 1,193 361 1,198 363 1,198 363 1,198 363 
R2 0.451 0.505 0.327 0.452 0.309 0.340 0.372 0.358 
Notes: Linear IV coefficients for (3)-(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions exclude 
own education, whether fostered and age at first marriage; other controls are as listed in Table 3 notes.  
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Table 12: Inequality decomposition for log consumption per person implied by Table 4 
 
 Share of inequality attributable to each source (%): 
 All Rural Urban Men Women 
       
Male -0.07 -1.03 0.60 -- -- 
Age -0.65 0.39 1.11 -0.07 -2.81 
Age squared 0.05 -0.05 -0.89 0.66 2.44 
Muslim -0.05 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 
Serere 0.79 3.40 -0.28 1.14 0.54 
Poular 0.26 0.63 1.02 0.84 0.03 
Diola 0.04 0.94 -0.01 0.02 0.30 
Mandingue 0.25 -0.10 1.10 0.55 0.07 
Sarakole -0.06 0.41 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 
Mandiaque 0.05 0.91 0.36 -0.09 0.32 
Other ethnicity -0.01 0.36 -0.08 0.17 0.00 
Brothers same father 0.001 -0.08 0.19 0.09 -0.03 
Brothers same parents 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.43 0.00 
Sisters same father 0.39 0.62 0.24 0.01 0.82 
Sisters same parents 0.34 0.70 0.20 0.15 0.91 
Brothers same mother 0.55 0.44 0.52 0.87 0.38 
Sisters same mother -0.17 0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.26 
First same gender 0.004 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.06 
First of siblings 0.06 0.00 0.36 -0.05 0.36 
First born is male 0.34 2.04 -0.08 0.06 0.03 
Father dead recently 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Father in farming -1.60 -0.50 -0.87 -0.84 -2.12 
Mother in farming 1.42 2.74 -0.04 1.49 1.48 
Father in non-farm 4.45 1.19 3.41 4.90 4.03 
Mother in non-farm -0.48 -0.01 0.68 -0.15 -0.64 
Father in ‘other’ 0.02 -0.27 1.01 -0.28 0.15 
Mother in ‘other’ 0.65 0.96 -0.03 0.80 0.67 
Father’s schooling 1.08 -0.08 1.59 2.17 0.57 
Mother’s schooling 1.08 0.33 1.99 0.10 2.61 
Father rural -0.23 0.04 0.20 -1.83 1.20 
Mother rural 2.46 0.13 0.74 4.07 1.15 
Log hh size 13.82 17.98 19.20 13.95 13.87 
Log cell size 4.16 13.65 5.83 4.75 1.28 
Share of cell aged<5 1.59 3.04 1.29 2.13 1.03 
Share of cell adults 9.25 8.99 14.39 5.47 8.62 
Has formal schooling 9.02 1.27 11.02 6.92 9.76 
Fostered 0.65 0.47 0.79 0.79 0.19 
Fostered young -0.001 0.01 -0.02 -0.29 0.51 
Age at first marriage -0.07 0.98 -0.56 -0.55 0.91 
Inherited land 0.60 -0.07 0.38 1.80 0.16 
Inherited house 0.45 0.32 0.66 -0.15 0.92 
Other inheritance 0.03 0.10 1.04 -0.47 -0.01 
Rural 14.43 -- -- 15.25 14.88 
      
Total share explained 46.50   27.90   41.50   47.00   46.20   
 Note: The sources do not add to the total share explained due to the omission of the share of inequality due to 
department of residence.    
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Statistical Addendum 
Intergenerational Mobility and Interpersonal Inequality  
in an African Economy 
Sylvie Lambert, Martin Ravallion and Dominique van de Walle 
 
To further explore the characteristics of those who inherit, Table A2 gives probits for any 
form of inheritance, while Table A3 gives probits for land inheritance in particular; in both cases 
we present the marginal effects. We also provide the breakdown by gender. We show two 
specifications, the second of which drops a number of variables that might be considered 
endogenous to inheritance. (Later we will use these pruned regressions as the first stage for an 
instrumental variables estimator.) While the causal interpretation of the first regression 
(including the endogenous variables) can be questioned, it is still of descriptive interest.  
We include a wide range of controls in these regressions (and those reported later), 
including: gender, age and age squared, age at first marriage, whether one is the first born of a 
given gender among siblings with the same mother and same father, whether one is the first born 
among all children with the same mother and father, whether the first born sibling from the same 
mother and father is a boy, number of brothers from the same father and mother, number of 
brothers from the same father only and same mother only, and the same three variables for 
sisters, ethnic group, being Muslim relative to other religions, having some formal education, 
whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered at a young age (prior to two years of age, which 
typically implies a permanent move for the child in the Senegal context).  There are also controls 
for parental characteristics (education, occupation, place of residence, whether the father died in 
the last two years, and whether the mother did so) and some demographic variables describing 
the household (log household size) and the individual’s cell (log cell size, share of adults and 
share of children age 5 and under).   
We continue to find that men are more likely to inherit than women, even with the 
controls. Conditional on the included controls, being male adds 0.11 to 0.13 to the conditional 
probability of receiving any inheritance, while it adds 0.08 to the probability of inheriting land.  
Unsurprisingly, the death of either parent increases the probability of inheritance, and the 
coefficients are considerably higher for paternal death. In the full sample, death of the father 
alone adds 0.67 to the probability of inheritance, while death of the mother adds only 0.13; with 
respect to land inheritance the probability is increased by 0.32  by a deceased father, but only by 
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0.03 by a deceased  mother. This later estimate reflects the previously noted fact that at a 
woman’s death, her land is returned to her husband (or brothers) first. By contrast, children 
inherit from their father at his death, whether or not their mother is still alive. These effects are 
significant across almost all strata and specifications, the only exception being that death of the 
mother is not a significant predictor of land inheritance by women.  The effect of a father’s 
recent death dampens the large “father dead” effect for any inheritance (bringing it down from 
0.67 to 0.54, when the mother is still alive).  This is consistent with our casual observations from 
interviews that inheritance, particularly of the house and non-land assets, is typically delayed.1 
The dampening effect is much lower for land inheritance and significant only for men.  
There is a positive coefficient on education in the regressions for any inheritance, which 
suggests complementarity rather than substitution by parents between formal schooling and 
inheritance (whereby some children get some form of inheritance while others get formal 
schooling as hypothesized by Quisumbing et al. 2004). However, there is some sign of such 
substitution for land inheritance, though it is only statistically significant for women; those 
women with formal schooling are less likely to inherit land. Depending on the timing of parents’ 
death, this might reflect the individual choice of an educated woman with a non-farm economic 
activity to give up her land inheritance to the benefit of her siblings, rather than a parental 
decision to substitute one form of transmission for another. 
Men who were fostered as boys are more likely to inherit land unless they were fostered 
before age two. This pattern is plausible. Fostering out a very young child is suggestive of giving 
away the child (for example to a childless parent), which is an indication that inheritance is 
unlikely. By contrast, fostering an older child is in general less permanent and more suggestive 
of an investment in the child, which would also suggest that inheritance is more likely.2  None of 
these effects are statistically significant for girls. 
Having a mother active in the non-farm sector significantly increases the probability of 
any inheritance for men although not for women. For land inheritance, paternal activity in farm 
work has no effect, but maternal farm work has a positive correlation with men’s, and less so 
women’s, land inheritance. This could reflect the fact that a mother in farming suggests a greater 
availability of land for the parental household. The father’s non-farm activity matters but 
negatively ─ significantly reducing the likelihood of inheriting land for both genders. In fact, 
                                                            
1 This is due in part to the difficulty of distributing the inheritance – much of which consists of the dwelling, 
is lumpy – across the extended kinship group.  
2 See Beck et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of fostering practices in Senegal. 
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symmetrically to the previous result, a father’s involvement in a non-farm activity reduces the 
likelihood that the household has control over any land at all. 
Finally, the number of siblings of the opposite gender is significantly associated with 
inheriting from one’s parents. For men a positive effect on land and on any inheritance is related 
to the number of sisters from the same father, whether or not they also share their mother (i.e 
same father or same parents).3 This is in accordance with traditional results on siblings rivalry, 
suggesting that, if boys are favored with respect to inheritance, controlling for the number of 
siblings, a higher share of sisters is beneficial to men. For women, the number of brothers from 
the same mother reduces the likelihood of getting any inheritance while more brothers from the 
same father has a significant but very small positive influence on land inheritance.4 Brothers with 
the same mother may well compete with girls for the inheritance of their mother’s personal 
assets. 
Controlling for these other variables, there is little sign that the probability of inheritance 
is different between urban and rural areas for men. However, women’s probability of any 
inheritance is lower in rural areas. 
 
References:  
Beck, Simon, Philippe De Vreyer, Sylvie Lambert, Karine Marazyan et Abla Safir, 2011, “Child 
Fostering in Senegal,” mimeo, Paris School of Economics. 
 
Garg, Ashish and Jonathan Morduch, 1998, “Sibling Rivalry and the Gender Gap: Evidence from 
Child Health Outcomes in Ghana,” Journal of Population Economics 11(4):471-493. 
 
Quisumbing, Agnes, Jonna P. Estudillo and Keijiro Otsuka, 2004, Land and Schooling: 
Transferring Wealth Across Generations. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press for the International Food Policy Research Institute.  
                                                            
3 “Sibling from same parents” means that the siblings share both parents. By contrast, “sibling from the same 
father” means that the father is common, but not the mother (and conversely for “sibling from the same mother”). 
4 These correlations bring to mind the literature on sibling rivalry in Africa and the role of siblings of the 
opposite sex in determining outcomes (for ex., Garg and Morduch 1998).  
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for cell heads 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log cell consumption per capita 4339 12.528 1.017 9.932 18.059 
In farming  4365 0.196 0.397 0 1 
In non-farm 4365 0.454 0.498 0 1 
In other 4365 0.084 0.277 0 1 
Same residence as parents 4365 0.539 0.499 0 1 
Male 4365 0.429 0.495 0 1 
Age 4360 42.594 14.931 2 98 
Muslim 4365 0.948 0.221 0 1 
Serere ethnicity 4352 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Poular ethnicity 4352 0.283 0.450 0 1 
Diola ethnicity 4352  0.046 0.210 0 1 
Mandingue ethnicity 4352  0.062 0.241 0 1 
Sarakole ethnicity 4352  0.027 0.162 0 1 
Mandiaque ethnicity 4352  0.012 0.110 0 1 
Other ethnicity 4352  0.039 0.193 0 1 
Brothers same father (no.) 4313  1.671 2.319 0 21 
Brothers same parents (no.) 4320  1.984 1.648 0 11 
Sisters same father (no.) 4309 1.533 2.239 0 17 
Sisters same parents (no.) 4321  1.945 1.690 0 14 
Brothers same mother (no.) 4314  0.317 0.888 0 10 
Sisters same mother (no.) 4313  0.290 0.856 0 10 
First born same gender 4365  0.470 0.499 0 1 
First born of siblings 4365  0.294 0.456 0 1 
First born is male 4271 0.568 0.495 0 1 
Father dead recently 4365 0.075 0.263 0 1 
Father in farming 4365 0.354 0.478 0 1 
Mother in farming 4365 0.208 0.406 0 1 
Father in non-farm 4365 0.320 0.466 0 1 
Mother in non-farm 4365 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Father in ‘other’ 4365 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Mother in ‘other’ 4365 0.020 0.139 0 1 
Father’s schooling 4365 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Mother’s schooling 4365 0.056 0.231 0 1 
Father rural 3896 0.599 0.490 0 1 
Mother rural 3968 0.589 0.492 0 1 
Log hh size 4365 2.122 0.700 0 3.784 
Log cell size 4365  0.967 0.694 0 2.708 
Share of cell members aged<5 4365 0.144 0.213 0 0.800 
Share of adults in cell 4365 0.651 0.315 0 1 
Has formal education 4365 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Fostered 4365 0.162 0.368 0 1 
Fostered young 4365 0.079 0.269 0 1 
Age at first marriage 4080 22.614 6.827 6 65 
Inherited land 4365 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Inherited house 4365 0.338 0.473 0 1 
Otherinheritance 4365 0.216 0.411 0 1 
Rural 4365 0.487 0.500 0 1 
Father dead 4337 0.661 0.473 0 1 
Mother dead 4277 0.402 0.490 0 1 
Notes: The statistics are population weighted. The variables ‘First born same gender’, ‘First born of 
siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the same father, same mother. 
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Table A2: Marginal determinants of the probability of any inheritance 
  All Men Women 
Male 0.110*** 0.125*** -- -- -- -- 
 (0.0319) (0.0250)     
Age -0.00483 -0.00273 0.00590 0.00678 -0.00419 -0.00269 
 (0.00472) (0.00426) (0.00753) (0.00696) (0.00567) (0.00523) 
Age squared 4.71e-05 2.56e-05 -5.81e-05 -6.72e-05 4.06e-05 2.13e-05 
 (4.46e-05) (4.09e-05) (6.89e-05) (6.45e-05) (5.62e-05) (5.24e-05) 
Muslim 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.180* 0.157 0.162*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0509) (0.0966) (0.0954) (0.0507) (0.0441) 
Serere ethnicity -0.0844** -0.0800** -0.0728 -0.0647 -0.100** -0.0956** 
 (0.0385) (0.0366) (0.0622) (0.0594) (0.0413) (0.0391) 
Poular ethnicity 0.00432 0.00590 0.0396 0.0310 -0.0311 -0.0130 
 (0.0356) (0.0343) (0.0499) (0.0488) (0.0406) (0.0395) 
Diola ethnicity -0.00781 -0.00120 -0.101 -0.0864 0.0523 0.0549 
 (0.0772) (0.0734) (0.0982) (0.0958) (0.0909) (0.0858) 
Mandingue ethnicity 0.0181 0.0111 0.0326 0.00838 -0.0141 -0.00501 
 (0.0501) (0.0487) (0.0771) (0.0758) (0.0533) (0.0519) 
Sarakole ethnicity 0.0464 0.0658 0.0920 0.132 0.0111 0.0155 
 (0.103) (0.0996) (0.136) (0.125) (0.121) (0.119) 
Mandiaque ethnicity 0.0913 0.0726 0.182 0.166 0.0351 0.0425 
 (0.167) (0.159) (0.218) (0.225) (0.160) (0.150) 
Other ethnicity -0.131** -0.131** -0.167* -0.182* -0.103 -0.0926 
 (0.0640) (0.0602) (0.0975) (0.0942) (0.0728) (0.0696) 
Brothers same father 0.000819 0.00107 -0.00473 -0.00532 0.00780 0.00817 
 (0.00653) (0.00638) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.00785) (0.00750) 
Brothers same parents -0.00323 -0.00281 -0.0129 -0.0108 0.000203 0.000777 
 (0.00710) (0.00686) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.00869) (0.00821) 
Sisters same father 0.0229*** 0.0225*** 0.0343*** 0.0379*** 0.0133* 0.0106 
 (0.00681) (0.00661) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.00796) (0.00761) 
Sisters same parents 0.0154** 0.0172** 0.0259** 0.0264** 0.00998 0.0111 
 (0.00727) (0.00724) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.00874) (0.00867) 
Brothers same mother -0.0238* -0.0219* 0.000834 0.00442 -0.0395** -0.0388** 
 (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0246) (0.0231) (0.0172) (0.0163) 
Sisters same mother -0.0100 -0.0127 -0.0342 -0.0361 0.000391 -0.00178 
 (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0247) (0.0232) (0.0172) (0.0164) 
First same gender 0.0257 0.0219 -0.0494 -0.0496 0.0622* 0.0645* 
 (0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0521) (0.0515) (0.0363) (0.0347) 
First of siblings -0.000272 -0.00876 0.0302 0.0322 -0.0228 -0.0409 
 (0.0308) (0.0298) (0.0581) (0.0575) (0.0440) (0.0417) 
First born is male 0.0369 0.0322 0.0746 0.0600 0.0220 0.0103 
 (0.0225) (0.0219) (0.0471) (0.0460) (0.0304) (0.0291) 
Father died recently -0.134*** -0.140*** -0.237*** -0.248*** -0.0828** -0.0779** 
 (0.0344) (0.0325) (0.0607) (0.0545) (0.0375) (0.0366) 
Father is dead 0.671*** 0.664*** 0.739*** 0.732*** 0.630*** 0.621*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0185) 
Mother is dead 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.110** 0.130*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 
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 (0.0269) (0.0264) (0.0434) (0.0421) (0.0321) (0.0314) 
Father in farming -0.0210 -0.0146 0.0400 0.0474 -0.0426 -0.0392 
 (0.0291) (0.0282) (0.0430) (0.0416) (0.0341) (0.0331) 
Mother in farm 0.0518 0.0588* 0.0258 0.0228 0.0641 0.0731* 
 (0.0338) (0.0330) (0.0524) (0.0514) (0.0408) (0.0397) 
Father in non-farm 0.0330 0.0460 -0.00540 0.0121 0.0574 0.0651* 
 (0.0330) (0.0320) (0.0490) (0.0477) (0.0405) (0.0390) 
Mother in non-farm 0.0920** 0.0818** 0.123** 0.119** 0.0588 0.0484 
 (0.0362) (0.0351) (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0439) (0.0414) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.0138 -0.0183 0.0648 0.0560 -0.112 -0.107 
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.124) (0.123) (0.135) (0.122) 
Mother in ‘other’ 0.0355 0.0227 -0.0786 -0.0867 0.127 0.112 
 (0.0825) (0.0801) (0.102) (0.100) (0.128) (0.126) 
Father’s schooling 0.0220 0.0264 0.0682 0.0877 0.00642 0.00123 
 (0.0395) (0.0377) (0.0598) (0.0575) (0.0466) (0.0441) 
Mother’s schooling -0.0246 0.00139 -0.156** -0.115 0.0332 0.0540 
 (0.0491) (0.0489) (0.0736) (0.0726) (0.0603) (0.0591) 
Father rural -0.0293 -0.0415 -0.113 -0.152** 0.0146 0.0165 
 (0.0465) (0.0452) (0.0748) (0.0725) (0.0518) (0.0508) 
Mother rural 0.0680 0.0669 0.172** 0.174** 0.0196 0.0147 
 (0.0457) (0.0440) (0.0754) (0.0737) (0.0509) (0.0494) 
Log hh size 0.00423 0.00849 0.0284 0.0253 -0.0140 -0.0147 
 (0.0216) (0.0198) (0.0331) (0.0303) (0.0249) (0.0234) 
Log cell size 0.0469** 0.0426* 0.0711* 0.0671* 0.00828 0.0189 
 (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0379) (0.0364) (0.0312) (0.0297) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.00584 -0.00368 -0.0423 -0.0339 -0.00915 -0.0266 
 (0.0792) (0.0748) (0.161) (0.154) (0.0863) (0.0813) 
Share of cell adults 0.0184 0.0173 0.0767 0.0567 -0.0371 -0.0171 
 (0.0592) (0.0568) (0.107) (0.104) (0.0718) (0.0682) 
Has formal schooling 0.0605** -- 0.0897** -- 0.0475 -- 
 (0.0294)  (0.0425)  (0.0381)  
Fostered 0.00479 -- -0.00501 -- -0.00848 -- 
 (0.0396)  (0.0552)  (0.0564)  
Fostered young 0.0238 -- 0.0686 -- -0.0113 -- 
 (0.0533)  (0.0876)  (0.0644)  
Age at first marriage 0.00155 -- 0.00362 -- -0.00240 -- 
 (0.00222)  (0.00325)  (0.00283)  
Rural -0.00245 -0.0173 0.0936 0.0808 -0.0861* -0.0878* 
 (0.0474) (0.0450) (0.0702) (0.0661) (0.0520) (0.0494) 
No. Observations 3,383 3,587 1,478 1,561 1,905 2,026 
Pseudo R2 0.369 0.372 0.403 0.402 0.374 0.378 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The 
variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the same father, same 
mother. The regression also includes department fixed effects. The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other 
religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table A3: Marginal determinants of the probability of land inheritance (also used as first 
stage regressions for IV estimators) 
 
 All Men Women 
Male 0.0814*** 0.0840*** -- -- -- --
 (0.0182) (0.0150)     
Age -0.00462* -0.00433* 7.91e-05 -0.00293 -0.00447** -0.00350* 
 (0.00262) (0.00230) (0.00513) (0.00485) (0.00221) (0.00186) 
Age squared 4.93e-05** 4.82e-05** 9.50e-06 3.65e-05 4.36e-05** 3.78e-05** 
 (2.45e-05) (2.18e-05) (4.61e-05) (4.39e-05) (2.16e-05) (1.86e-05) 
Muslim 0.0501** 0.0506** 0.0665 0.0622 0.0402*** 0.0381***
 (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.0487) (0.0516) (0.0142) (0.0118) 
Serere ethnicity 0.0313 0.0171 0.0974* 0.0616 -0.000391 -0.00362 
 (0.0243) (0.0216) (0.0509) (0.0466) (0.0177) (0.0147) 
Poular ethnicity -0.00435 -0.00777 0.0293 0.00781 -0.0181 -0.01000 
 (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0347) (0.0337) (0.0145) (0.0129) 
Diola ethnicity 0.0475 0.0340 0.0159 0.0115 0.0598 0.0400 
 (0.0552) (0.0497) (0.0790) (0.0800) (0.0588) (0.0482) 
Mandingue ethnicity 0.0320 0.0259 0.0611 0.0319 0.00378 0.00915 
 (0.0312) (0.0288) (0.0601) (0.0568) (0.0225) (0.0207) 
Sarakole ethnicity 0.00110 -0.0101 0.0919 0.0278 -0.0237 -0.0163 
 (0.0494) (0.0423) (0.124) (0.101) (0.0238) (0.0229) 
Mandiaque ethnicity 0.179 0.154 0.413 0.368 0.0713 0.0527 
 (0.198) (0.175) (0.296) (0.296) (0.117) (0.0940) 
Other ethnicity -0.0438 -0.0377 -0.0234 -0.0384 -0.0395** -0.0299* 
 (0.0293) (0.0285) (0.0674) (0.0633) (0.0154) (0.0153) 
Brothers same father 0.00739** 0.00623** 0.00837 0.00623 0.00672** 0.00551** 
 (0.00325) (0.00309) (0.00673) (0.00674) (0.00287) (0.00251) 
Brothers same parents 
 
-5.29e-06 -0.00175 -0.00145 -0.00374 -0.00101 -0.00127 
(0.00393) (0.00371) (0.00841) (0.00822) (0.00346) (0.00303) 
Sisters same father 0.00251 0.00499 0.0112 0.0176** -0.00114 -0.000253
 (0.00339) (0.00325) (0.00691) (0.00730) (0.00292) (0.00250) 
Sisters same parents 0.00644* 0.00585* 0.0152** 0.0142* 0.00130 0.000958 
 (0.00373) (0.00347) (0.00751) (0.00740) (0.00332) (0.00291) 
Brothers same mother -0.0173** -0.0188*** 0.00313 -0.00298 -0.0275*** -0.0250***
(0.00734) (0.00716) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.00776) (0.00710) 
Sisters same mother -0.00739 -0.00761 -0.0207 -0.0179 -0.00238 -0.00220
 (0.00798) (0.00753) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.00657) (0.00586) 
First same gender 0.0130 0.00945 0.00293 0.00438 0.0151 0.0135 
 (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0139) (0.0124) 
First of siblings 0.00391 0.00301 -0.00556 -0.0158 0.0115 0.00943 
 (0.0162) (0.0155) (0.0393) (0.0395) (0.0180) (0.0157) 
First born is male 0.0169 0.0144 0.0492* 0.0464 0.00980 0.00695
 (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0297) (0.0304) (0.0117) (0.0102) 
Father died recently -0.0430*** -0.0423*** -0.0965*** -0.0960*** -0.0198 -0.0176* 
 (0.0154) (0.0142) (0.0299) (0.0297) (0.0121) (0.0106) 
Father is dead 0.319*** 0.312*** 0.418*** 0.409*** 0.242*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0166) (0.0160) 
Mother is dead 0.0301* 0.0306** 0.0418 0.0533* 0.0209 0.0162 
 (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0291) (0.0304) (0.0141) (0.0124) 
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Father in farming -0.0145 -0.0103 0.00332 0.0112 -0.0146 -0.0127 
 (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0126) (0.0112) 
Mother in farm. 0.0477** 0.0463** 0.0869** 0.0703* 0.0259 0.0263* 
 (0.0192) (0.0184) (0.0404) (0.0389) (0.0166) (0.0151) 
Father in non-farm -0.0584*** -0.0569*** -0.0839*** -0.0877*** -0.0388*** -0.0359***
 (0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0309) (0.0305) (0.0139) (0.0124) 
Mother in non-farm 0.00596 0.00769 0.00526 0.00582 0.00584 0.00407 
 (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0422) (0.0419) (0.0179) (0.0156) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.0443 -0.0474 -0.0227 -0.0481 -0.0384 -0.0342 
 (0.0507) (0.0451) (0.144) (0.123) (0.0326) (0.0293) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.0351 -0.0226 -0.0616 -0.0477 -0.0198 -0.0110 
 (0.0330) (0.0348) (0.0561) (0.0624) (0.0304) (0.0306) 
Father’s schooling 0.00167 -0.000215 -0.0560 -0.0503 0.0288 0.0179 
 (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0416) (0.0445) (0.0265) (0.0214) 
Mother’s schooling 0.000504 -0.00889 -0.0490 -0.0552 0.0176 0.00275 
 (0.0324) (0.0275) (0.0492) (0.0469) (0.0370) (0.0273) 
Father rural 0.0259 0.0280 -0.0101 -0.0139 0.0287 0.0315* 
 (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0497) (0.0496) (0.0175) (0.0161) 
Mother rural 0.0621*** 0.0616*** 0.105** 0.108** 0.0352* 0.0294* 
 (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0454) (0.0460) (0.0181) (0.0164) 
Log hh size 0.0298*** 0.0190* 0.0535** 0.0323 0.0118 0.00760 
 (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.00964) (0.00820) 
Log cell size 0.00880 0.00894 -0.00701 -0.0117 0.00308 0.00599 
 (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0112) (0.00960) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.0670 -0.0718* -0.167 -0.191 -0.0428 -0.0347 
 (0.0450) (0.0415) (0.130) (0.126) (0.0334) (0.0285) 
Share of cell adults -0.00608 -0.0150 -0.0936 -0.112 -0.00196 -0.00760 
 (0.0315) (0.0295) (0.0745) (0.0728) (0.0258) (0.0224) 
Has formal schooling 
 
-0.0235* -- -0.0247 -- -0.0205* -- 
(0.0140)  (0.0276)  (0.0117)  
Fostered 0.0491** -- 0.119*** -- -0.0245 -- 
 (0.0232)  (0.0461)  (0.0167)  
Fostered young -0.0477** -- -0.111*** -- 0.0116 -- 
 (0.0199)  (0.0327)  (0.0292)  
Age at first marriage 9.53e-05 -- 0.000723 -- -0.000936 -- 
 (0.00107)  (0.00199)  (0.00110)  
Rural 0.00706 0.00681 0.0705 0.0744* -0.0222 -0.0166 
 (0.0237) (0.0222) (0.0454) (0.0446) (0.0187) (0.0160) 
No. Observations 3,383 3,587 1,478 1,561 1,866 2,026 
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.354 0.385 0.370 0.356 0.363 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the same father, same 
mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies.  The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all 
other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table A4: Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and 
without controls for sample whose father is dead 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 No controls 
Rural location 
and department 
dummies 
As in (2) + controls for 
individual and household 
characteristics 
        
Inherited land -0.337*** -0.111** -0.0633 
 (0.0549) (0.0444) (0.0464) 
Inherited house 0.184*** 0.0705* 0.0852** 
 (0.0475) (0.0390) (0.0407) 
Other inheritance 0.00414 0.0840* 0.0559 
 (0.0518) (0.0451) (0.0433) 
Constant 12.56*** 12.87*** 13.28*** 
 (0.0367) (0.247) (0.445) 
Observations 2,852 2,852 2,302 
R2 0.022 0.335 0.473 
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Table A5: Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and 
without controls for sample whose mother is dead. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 No controls 
Rural location 
and department 
dummies 
As in (2) + controls for 
individual and household 
characteristics 
        
Inherited land -0.357*** -0.159*** -0.105* 
 (0.0648) (0.0531) (0.0548) 
Inherited house 0.162*** 0.0785 0.0654 
 (0.0608) (0.0490) (0.0508) 
Other inheritance 0.0800 0.136** 0.100* 
 (0.0639) (0.0550) (0.0553) 
Constant 12.53*** 12.79*** 13.44*** 
 (0.0434) (0.374) (0.452) 
Observations 1,708 1,708 1,407 
R2 0.020 0.357 0.474 
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Table A6: Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and without 
controls for sample whose father & mother are dead 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 No controls 
Rural location 
and department 
dummies 
As in (2) + controls for 
individual and household 
characteristics 
        
Inherited land -0.339*** -0.107** -0.0653 
 (0.0542) (0.0434) (0.0453) 
Inherited house 0.181*** 0.0641* 0.0710* 
 (0.0464) (0.0384) (0.0395) 
Other inheritance 0.0142 0.0905** 0.0681 
 (0.0504) (0.0440) (0.0429) 
Constant 12.56*** 13.11*** 13.42*** 
 (0.0349) (0.387) (0.390) 
Observations 3,088 3,088 2,484 
R2 0.020 0.334 0.467 
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Table A7: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita on the sample for whom father is dead 
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Urban 
(4) 
Men 
(5) 
Women 
Male -0.00494 -0.0670 0.0578 -- -- 
 (0.0494) (0.0715) (0.0687)   
Age -0.00195 -0.0113 0.00881 0.00426 -0.0137 
 (0.00781) (0.00930) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0103) 
Age squared -1.58e-06 5.55e-05 -6.27e-05 -6.72e-05 0.000140 
 (7.54e-05) (8.93e-05) (0.000120) (0.000111) (0.000105) 
Muslim 0.0801 0.107 0.0264 0.0706 0.0411 
 (0.0935) (0.149) (0.113) (0.138) (0.104) 
Serere ethnicity -0.217*** -0.233 -0.220*** -0.274*** -0.160* 
 (0.0770) (0.157) (0.0788) (0.0961) (0.0903) 
Poular ethnicity -0.0723 0.0509 -0.132* -0.123 -0.0417 
 (0.0642) (0.115) (0.0748) (0.0807) (0.0740) 
Diola ethnicity -0.157 -0.199 -0.112 -0.00241 -0.326*** 
 (0.113) (0.380) (0.123) (0.176) (0.116) 
Mandingue ethnicity -0.0900 0.127 -0.199** -0.161 -0.0180 
 (0.103) (0.186) (0.0901) (0.110) (0.123) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.180 -0.129 -0.156 -0.246 -0.134 
 (0.135) (0.203) (0.183) (0.186) (0.160) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.394* -0.828* -0.321 -0.254 -0.540** 
 (0.222) (0.459) (0.214) (0.244) (0.271) 
Other ethnicity -0.114 0.0134 -0.176* -0.0624 -0.188 
 (0.120) (0.230) (0.0979) (0.156) (0.154) 
Brothers same father -0.00477 -0.0243 0.00537 -0.0126 0.00359 
 (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0131) 
Brothers same parents 0.00136 0.0184 -0.00951 0.0318* -0.0278* 
 (0.0115) (0.0180) (0.0149) (0.0185) (0.0142) 
Sisters same father 0.0106 0.0200 0.00638 0.0172 0.00465 
 (0.0108) (0.0162) (0.0148) (0.0175) (0.0130) 
Sisters same parents 0.0278** 0.0373* 0.0221 0.0280 0.0345** 
 (0.0114) (0.0201) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0158) 
Brothers same mother 0.0607*** 0.0669 0.0556** 0.0812** 0.0491* 
 (0.0222) (0.0422) (0.0243) (0.0319) (0.0282) 
Sisters same mother -0.0449** -0.0332 -0.0422* -0.0398 -0.0534* 
 (0.0218) (0.0428) (0.0247) (0.0376) (0.0280) 
First same gender 0.0266 0.0811 -0.0261 0.0358 0.0434 
 (0.0378) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0697) (0.0567) 
First of siblings -0.00640 -0.0217 0.0120 -0.0620 0.0408 
 (0.0456) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.0780) (0.0765) 
First born is male 0.0731** 0.132** 0.0198 0.0835 0.0922* 
 (0.0372) (0.0532) (0.0495) (0.0723) (0.0508) 
Father died recently -0.0119 -0.0120 0.0118 0.0302 -0.0502 
 (0.0545) (0.0775) (0.0745) (0.102) (0.0617) 
Father in farming 0.147*** 0.112 0.195*** 0.131* 0.142** 
 (0.0504) (0.0687) (0.0719) (0.0683) (0.0639) 
Mother in farm -0.103* -0.107 -0.0722 -0.176** -0.0755 
 (0.0543) (0.0745) (0.0712) (0.0732) (0.0647) 
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Father in non-farm 0.238*** 0.334*** 0.199*** 0.265*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0995) (0.0653) (0.0731) (0.0688) 
Mother in non-farm -0.160*** -0.153 -0.159** -0.213** -0.114* 
 (0.0554) (0.0933) (0.0693) (0.0922) (0.0639) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.722**  0.614** 0.870** 0.651 
 (0.293)  (0.285) (0.425) (0.466) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.224* -0.233* 0.430*** -0.269* -0.136 
 (0.127) (0.132) (0.113) (0.140) (0.275) 
Father’s schooling 0.0835 -0.152 0.130* 0.166* 0.0399 
 (0.0634) (0.118) (0.0710) (0.101) (0.0748) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0664 0.0763 0.0604 -0.0280 0.157* 
 (0.0693) (0.120) (0.0845) (0.105) (0.0940) 
Father rural 0.0254 0.0378 -0.0198 0.0441 -0.00750 
 (0.0611) (0.102) (0.0805) (0.105) (0.0706) 
Mother rural -0.0754 -0.0562 -0.0820 -0.0646 -0.0673 
 (0.0610) (0.103) (0.0821) (0.109) (0.0696) 
Log hh size -0.292*** -0.245*** -0.330*** -0.250*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0730) (0.0455) (0.0557) (0.0489) 
Log cell size -0.110*** -0.180*** -0.0797* -0.102* -0.0773 
 (0.0331) (0.0506) (0.0435) (0.0596) (0.0525) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.142 -0.241 -0.0144 -0.504* -0.0450 
 (0.131) (0.169) (0.192) (0.265) (0.159) 
Share of cell adults 0.446*** 0.247* 0.538*** 0.410** 0.465*** 
 (0.0939) (0.148) (0.119) (0.174) (0.118) 
Has formal schooling 0.278*** 0.151* 0.316*** 0.223*** 0.322*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0778) (0.0525) (0.0612) (0.0587) 
Fostered 0.160** 0.159* 0.156 0.203** 0.0688 
 (0.0650) (0.0881) (0.0960) (0.0929) (0.0869) 
Fostered young -0.0791 -0.110 -0.0913 -0.221 0.0577 
 (0.0796) (0.129) (0.107) (0.135) (0.107) 
Age at first marriage -0.00204 -0.000110 -0.00292 -0.00331 -2.16e-05 
 (0.00327) (0.00482) (0.00434) (0.00466) (0.00463) 
Inherited land -0.0633 -0.00845 -0.0983 -0.100 -0.0151 
 (0.0464) (0.0712) (0.0620) (0.0657) (0.0555) 
Inherited house 0.0852** 0.0629 0.124** 0.0751 0.0920* 
 (0.0407) (0.0688) (0.0498) (0.0588) (0.0508) 
Other inheritance 0.0559 0.0176 0.102* 0.158*** -0.0427 
 (0.0433) (0.0607) (0.0614) (0.0590) (0.0521) 
Rural -0.274***   -0.299*** -0.285*** 
 (0.0683)   (0.0951) (0.0808) 
Constant 13.28*** 13.29*** 12.34*** 12.70*** 12.74*** 
 (0.445) (0.500) (0.397) (0.536) (0.354) 
Observations 2,302 1,172 1,130 1,105 1,197 
R2 0.473 0.296 0.420 0.482 0.483 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ refer to children of the 
same father, same mother. Regressions contain department dummies.  Reference variables are Wolof 
ethnicity, other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no & non-formal schooling. 
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Table A8: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita, sample whose mother is dead 
      
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Urban 
(4) 
Men 
(5) 
Women 
Male -0.0166 -0.0921 -0.00706 -- -- 
 (0.0683) (0.0925) (0.102)   
Age -0.0189* -0.0249** -0.0172 -0.0113 -0.0297** 
 (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0207) (0.0166) (0.0150) 
Age squared 0.000128 0.000170 0.000137 4.36e-05 0.000265* 
 (9.78e-05) (0.000104) (0.000183) (0.000147) (0.000136) 
Muslim -0.00580 -0.128 0.0423 0.0271 -0.00366 
 (0.139) (0.246) (0.159) (0.184) (0.149) 
Serere ethnicity -0.157 -0.153 -0.244** -0.222* -0.0550 
 (0.105) (0.212) (0.107) (0.130) (0.127) 
Poular ethnicity 0.0255 0.132 -0.0385 -0.0950 0.119 
 (0.0809) (0.146) (0.0919) (0.112) (0.104) 
Diola ethnicity -0.225 -0.411 -0.138 -0.283 -0.182 
 (0.140) (0.446) (0.146) (0.217) (0.157) 
Mandingue ethnicity -0.00474 0.287 -0.155 -0.0671 0.0726 
 (0.127) (0.228) (0.124) (0.150) (0.166) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.200 0.110 -0.227 -0.485* 0.000947 
 (0.198) (0.282) (0.293) (0.258) (0.284) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.546** -0.912* -0.420 -0.503 -0.541** 
 (0.252) (0.550) (0.274) (0.335) (0.264) 
Other ethnicity -0.138 0.107 -0.285* -0.141 -0.163 
 (0.160) (0.279) (0.148) (0.204) (0.223) 
Brothers same father -0.0174 -0.0557*** 0.0161 -0.0153 -0.0204 
 (0.0158) (0.0201) (0.0228) (0.0278) (0.0186) 
Brothers same parents -0.00809 0.0147 -0.0256 -0.0252 -0.0287 
 (0.0181) (0.0269) (0.0240) (0.0293) (0.0245) 
Sisters same father 0.0269* 0.0519** 0.00229 0.0310 0.0311 
 (0.0157) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0238) (0.0203) 
Sisters same parents 0.0306* 0.0337 0.0362 0.0409* 0.0494** 
 (0.0161) (0.0232) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0246) 
Brothers same mother 0.0227 0.0320 0.0168 0.0607 -0.0144 
 (0.0300) (0.0437) (0.0430) (0.0398) (0.0492) 
Sisters same mother -0.00382 -0.0450 0.0444 -0.109*** 0.0482 
 (0.0396) (0.0363) (0.0677) (0.0404) (0.0604) 
First same gender -0.0189 -0.0245 0.00396 -0.0256 0.0295 
 (0.0529) (0.0739) (0.0800) (0.0900) (0.0897) 
First of siblings 0.0823 0.132 0.0194 -0.0255 0.144 
 (0.0634) (0.0895) (0.0842) (0.0979) (0.112) 
First born is male 0.0773 0.150** 0.0152 0.157* 0.0799 
 (0.0470) (0.0680) (0.0657) (0.0881) (0.0730) 
Father died recently 0.0597 -0.0720 0.210 0.117 -0.0114 
 (0.0885) (0.105) (0.151) (0.149) (0.103) 
Father in farming 0.0710 0.0315 0.134 -0.0428 0.174** 
 (0.0611) (0.0840) (0.0895) (0.0835) (0.0871) 
Mother in farm -0.0780 -0.0483 -0.0601 -0.0891 -0.0984 
 (0.0694) (0.0911) (0.0949) (0.0904) (0.0968) 
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Father in non-farm 0.220*** 0.212* 0.197** 0.214** 0.216** 
 (0.0698) (0.123) (0.0887) (0.0943) (0.0980) 
Mother in non-farm -0.131 0.242* -0.292*** -0.0850 -0.142 
 (0.0827) (0.144) (0.111) (0.140) (0.107) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.604* -0.186 0.802* 0.243 1.140 
 (0.350) (0.235) (0.473) (0.360) (0.720) 
Mother in ‘other’ 0.0389 -0.126 0.466*** 0.507* -0.162 
 (0.311) (0.458) (0.131) (0.269) (0.413) 
Father’s schooling 0.174* 0.225 0.0996 0.263* 0.134 
 (0.0961) (0.163) (0.107) (0.151) (0.128) 
Mother’s schooling 0.296* 0.258 0.376* 0.102 0.470 
 (0.158) (0.164) (0.217) (0.152) (0.290) 
Father rural -0.0157 -0.00662 -0.103 -0.137 0.0629 
 (0.0849) (0.144) (0.108) (0.146) (0.110) 
Mother rural 0.0425 0.202 0.0376 0.172 -0.00211 
 (0.0863) (0.148) (0.116) (0.150) (0.109) 
Log hh size -0.257*** -0.207** -0.297*** -0.251*** -0.262*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0835) (0.0603) (0.0720) (0.0635) 
Log cell size -0.0958** -0.119* -0.0816 -0.0970 -0.0723 
 (0.0445) (0.0645) (0.0602) (0.0779) (0.0702) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.564*** -0.601*** -0.494 -0.933** -0.483** 
 (0.186) (0.221) (0.329) (0.411) (0.235) 
Share of cell adults 0.340*** 0.211 0.425** 0.198 0.409*** 
 (0.118) (0.164) (0.168) (0.236) (0.152) 
Has formal schooling 0.265*** 0.114 0.323*** 0.154* 0.371*** 
 (0.0575) (0.102) (0.0685) (0.0806) (0.0924) 
Fostered 0.150* 0.125 0.139 0.264** 0.0346 
 (0.0788) (0.102) (0.117) (0.115) (0.112) 
Fostered young 0.0866 0.140 0.0785 -0.0492 0.196 
 (0.107) (0.161) (0.149) (0.187) (0.139) 
Age at first marriage 0.000842 0.00586 -0.000891 -0.00300 0.00667 
 (0.00389) (0.00603) (0.00537) (0.00525) (0.00568) 
Inherited land -0.105* -0.0766 -0.126* -0.177** -0.0200 
 (0.0548) (0.0848) (0.0726) (0.0756) (0.0768) 
Inherited house 0.0654 0.146* 0.0182 0.0821 0.0342 
 (0.0508) (0.0780) (0.0691) (0.0738) (0.0697) 
Other inheritance 0.100* 0.114 0.142* 0.195*** -0.0234 
 (0.0553) (0.0758) (0.0770) (0.0733) (0.0737) 
Rural -0.374***   -0.428*** -0.364*** 
 (0.0787)   (0.114) (0.100) 
Constant 13.44*** 13.35*** 13.28*** 13.22*** 13.61*** 
 (0.452) (0.671) (0.641) (0.782) (0.782) 
Observations 1,407 726 681 697 710 
R2 0.474 0.316 0.420 0.490 0.505 
Note: Robust st. errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ refer to children of same 
father, same mother. Regressions contain department dummies. Reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, 
other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no & non-formal schooling. 
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Table A9: Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita: sample with mother or father 
dead 
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Urban 
(4) 
Men 
(5) 
Women 
Male -0.0102 -0.0624 0.0244 -- -- 
 (0.0478) (0.0695) (0.0663)   
Age -0.00524 -0.0131 0.00453 0.00665 -0.0204* 
 (0.00766) (0.00877) (0.0127) (0.0114) (0.0105) 
Age squared 2.45e-05 7.69e-05 -4.09e-05 -9.12e-05 0.000196* 
 (7.32e-05) (8.44e-05) (0.000121) (0.000105) (0.000104) 
Muslim 0.0438 -0.0626 0.0816 0.0386 0.0202 
 (0.107) (0.200) (0.117) (0.150) (0.113) 
Serere ethnicity -0.207*** -0.229 -0.220*** -0.283*** -0.136 
 (0.0745) (0.150) (0.0769) (0.0939) (0.0877) 
Poular ethnicity -0.0489 0.0621 -0.107 -0.0950 -0.0164 
 (0.0628) (0.111) (0.0737) (0.0794) (0.0719) 
Diola ethnicity -0.176* -0.263 -0.116 -0.00646 -0.304*** 
 (0.106) (0.378) (0.113) (0.170) (0.107) 
Mandingue ethnicity -0.0884 0.151 -0.217** -0.167 -0.0208 
 (0.100) (0.183) (0.0872) (0.108) (0.120) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.180 -0.104 -0.153 -0.223 -0.139 
 (0.137) (0.203) (0.188) (0.180) (0.170) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.386* -0.775* -0.290 -0.267 -0.464* 
 (0.213) (0.454) (0.208) (0.224) (0.254) 
Other ethnicity -0.108 0.0465 -0.193* -0.0313 -0.186 
 (0.113) (0.213) (0.101) (0.153) (0.141) 
Brothers same father -0.00480 -0.0253* 0.00490 -0.00685 -0.00315 
 (0.0102) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0165) (0.0131) 
Brothers same parents 0.00174 0.0208 -0.0117 0.0269 -0.0255* 
 (0.0113) (0.0175) (0.0150) (0.0181) (0.0144) 
Sisters same father 0.0124 0.0206 0.00857 0.0115 0.0135 
 (0.0105) (0.0163) (0.0137) (0.0166) (0.0129) 
Sisters same parents 0.0282** 0.0373** 0.0248 0.0231 0.0420** 
 (0.0116) (0.0188) (0.0155) (0.0167) (0.0166) 
Brothers same mother 0.0498** 0.0559 0.0431 0.0886*** 0.0241 
 (0.0222) (0.0390) (0.0265) (0.0305) (0.0288) 
Sisters same mother -0.0221 -0.0199 -0.0155 -0.0389 -0.0153 
 (0.0245) (0.0330) (0.0348) (0.0367) (0.0340) 
First same gender 0.0205 0.0563 -0.00534 0.00243 0.0686 
 (0.0365) (0.0513) (0.0504) (0.0678) (0.0556) 
First of siblings 0.0136 -0.0126 0.0384 -0.0260 0.0479 
 (0.0442) (0.0603) (0.0611) (0.0753) (0.0743) 
First born is male 0.0745** 0.142*** 0.0130 0.0726 0.0948* 
 (0.0363) (0.0523) (0.0480) (0.0703) (0.0491) 
Father died recently -0.0200 -0.0163 -0.00594 0.0260 -0.0636 
 (0.0541) (0.0763) (0.0756) (0.101) (0.0613) 
Father in farming 0.132*** 0.0947 0.176** 0.0873 0.153** 
 (0.0480) (0.0648) (0.0704) (0.0645) (0.0597) 
Mother in farm -0.104** -0.119* -0.0279 -0.175** -0.0689 
 (0.0528) (0.0710) (0.0719) (0.0709) (0.0644) 
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Father in non-farm 0.217*** 0.270*** 0.200*** 0.223*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0950) (0.0625) (0.0713) (0.0650) 
Mother in non-farm -0.183*** -0.123 -0.201*** -0.216** -0.147** 
 (0.0545) (0.0888) (0.0705) (0.0880) (0.0644) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.448* -0.111 0.508* 0.453 0.488 
 (0.248) (0.302) (0.289) (0.317) (0.429) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.210* -0.202 0.448*** -0.241* -0.127 
 (0.124) (0.130) (0.110) (0.136) (0.267) 
Father’s schooling 0.109* -0.0784 0.124* 0.168* 0.0854 
 (0.0629) (0.119) (0.0700) (0.0983) (0.0765) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0868 0.0616 0.119 -0.0385 0.202 
 (0.0833) (0.120) (0.112) (0.106) (0.129) 
Father rural 0.0227 0.0806 -0.0412 0.0512 -0.0107 
 (0.0596) (0.0974) (0.0785) (0.103) (0.0704) 
Mother rural -0.0652 -0.0412 -0.0661 -0.0641 -0.0525 
 (0.0595) (0.0983) (0.0804) (0.107) (0.0699) 
Log hh size -0.294*** -0.270*** -0.311*** -0.274*** -0.315*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0724) (0.0465) (0.0540) (0.0499) 
Log cell size -0.113*** -0.176*** -0.0871** -0.108* -0.0666 
 (0.0319) (0.0469) (0.0424) (0.0573) (0.0513) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.222* -0.250 -0.156 -0.478* -0.155 
 (0.124) (0.161) (0.182) (0.252) (0.153) 
Share of cell adults 0.417*** 0.214 0.549*** 0.391** 0.463*** 
 (0.0909) (0.136) (0.119) (0.168) (0.117) 
Has formal schooling 0.276*** 0.131* 0.327*** 0.224*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0748) (0.0522) (0.0597) (0.0596) 
Fostered 0.141** 0.161* 0.132 0.204** 0.0387 
 (0.0604) (0.0837) (0.0879) (0.0894) (0.0764) 
Fostered young -0.0488 -0.108 -0.0420 -0.183 0.0795 
 (0.0760) (0.121) (0.103) (0.136) (0.0954) 
Age at first marriage -0.00143 -9.42e-05 -0.00102 -0.00296 0.000270 
 (0.00316) (0.00478) (0.00415) (0.00452) (0.00441) 
Inherited land -0.0653 -0.0114 -0.0939 -0.101 -0.0204 
 (0.0453) (0.0706) (0.0597) (0.0637) (0.0539) 
Inherited house 0.0710* 0.0684 0.0887* 0.0680 0.0742 
 (0.0395) (0.0671) (0.0490) (0.0574) (0.0493) 
Other inheritance 0.0681 0.0284 0.121* 0.178*** -0.0367 
 (0.0429) (0.0583) (0.0629) (0.0581) (0.0528) 
Rural -0.282***   -0.344*** -0.257*** 
 (0.0677)   (0.0937) (0.0791) 
Constant 13.03*** 12.74*** 12.56*** 12.76*** 13.63*** 
 (0.315) (0.535) (0.380) (0.521) (0.433) 
Observations 2,484 1,257 1,227 1,168 1,316 
R2 0.467 0.295 0.411 0.478 0.471 
Note: Robust st. errors in parentheses, clustered at the h’hold level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ refer to children of the same 
father, same mother. Regressions contain department dummies.  Reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, 
all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling.    
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Table A10: Regressions for log cell expenditure per equivalent adult 
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Urban 
(4) 
Men 
(5) 
Women 
Male 0.00966 -0.0258 0.0366   
 (0.0404) (0.0603) (0.0555)   
Age -0.00121 -0.00385 0.00374 0.00845 -0.0141* 
 (0.00618) (0.00755) (0.00985) (0.00989) (0.00818) 
Age squared -2.21e-05 -1.95e-05 -4.06e-05 -0.000124 0.000130 
 (6.17e-05) (7.55e-05) (9.76e-05) (9.35e-05) (8.57e-05) 
Muslim 0.0687 -0.105 0.139 0.103 0.0500 
 (0.0960) (0.202) (0.103) (0.126) (0.103) 
Serere ethnicity -0.175*** -0.186 -0.173** -0.228*** -0.128* 
 (0.0620) (0.120) (0.0679) (0.0830) (0.0686) 
Poular ethnicity -0.0477 0.0590 -0.0978 -0.0765 -0.0203 
 (0.0519) (0.0851) (0.0643) (0.0675) (0.0539) 
Diola ethnicity -0.157 -0.186 -0.0984 0.0162 -0.254*** 
 (0.100) (0.370) (0.102) (0.153) (0.0976) 
Mandingue ethnicity -0.0968 0.160 -0.243*** -0.160 -0.0506 
 (0.0871) (0.162) (0.0784) (0.100) (0.0959) 
Sarakole ethnicity -0.107 0.0369 -0.122 -0.180 -0.0362 
 (0.127) (0.241) (0.166) (0.179) (0.142) 
Mandiaque ethnicity -0.433** -0.647* -0.357* -0.173 -0.545*** 
 (0.185) (0.376) (0.193) (0.225) (0.199) 
Other ethnicity -0.0107 0.146 -0.136 0.0797 -0.101 
 (0.109) (0.180) (0.113) (0.141) (0.118) 
Brothers same father -0.00139 -0.0117 0.00330 0.00137 -0.00306 
 (0.00770) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0132) (0.00969) 
Brothers same parents 0.000624 0.00980 -0.00784 0.0158 -0.0141 
 (0.00936) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0118) 
Sisters same father 0.0127 0.0219* 0.00620 0.000495 0.0221** 
 (0.00782) (0.0120) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.00970) 
Sisters same parents 0.0184** 0.0273* 0.0142 0.0105 0.0303*** 
 (0.00904) (0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0117) 
Brothers same mother 0.0436** 0.0311 0.0461** 0.0748*** 0.0232 
 (0.0179) (0.0319) (0.0216) (0.0252) (0.0230) 
Sisters same mother -0.0284 -0.0289 -0.0223 -0.0412 -0.0222 
 (0.0207) (0.0267) (0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0290) 
First same gender -0.00352 0.0372 -0.0433 -0.0195 0.0173 
 (0.0317) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0590) (0.0452) 
First of siblings 0.0144 -0.0148 0.0490 -0.0280 0.0760 
 (0.0379) (0.0514) (0.0534) (0.0646) (0.0624) 
First born is male 0.0585* 0.112** -0.0108 0.0326 0.0935** 
 (0.0306) (0.0433) (0.0405) (0.0615) (0.0412) 
Father died recently -0.0104 0.0183 -0.0237 0.0308 -0.0350 
 (0.0532) (0.0761) (0.0734) (0.0988) (0.0582) 
Father in farming 0.0980** 0.0673 0.121* 0.0712 0.105** 
 (0.0415) (0.0532) (0.0651) (0.0562) (0.0490) 
Mother in farm -0.0720 -0.0920 0.00383 -0.0776 -0.0733 
 (0.0450) (0.0591) (0.0663) (0.0611) (0.0540) 
Father in non-farm 0.164*** 0.155** 0.168*** 0.182*** 0.137*** 
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 (0.0420) (0.0692) (0.0549) (0.0597) (0.0504) 
Mother in non-farm -0.116*** -0.0542 -0.135** -0.155** -0.0799 
 (0.0440) (0.0681) (0.0573) (0.0689) (0.0523) 
Father in ‘other’ 0.377** 0.135 0.534** 0.398** 0.361 
 (0.147) (0.180) (0.239) (0.199) (0.241) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.247*** -0.213** 0.0287 -0.210* -0.333** 
 (0.0934) (0.102) (0.244) (0.124) (0.158) 
Father’s schooling 0.0709 -0.0833 0.0988* 0.149* 0.0295 
 (0.0491) (0.0891) (0.0561) (0.0793) (0.0591) 
Mother’s schooling 0.162** 0.101 0.220*** 0.0356 0.242*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0934) (0.0826) (0.0870) (0.0902) 
Father rural 0.00279 -0.0321 -0.00972 0.0539 -0.0375 
 (0.0503) (0.0797) (0.0648) (0.0891) (0.0575) 
Mother rural -0.0717 -0.0439 -0.0797 -0.137 -0.0228 
 (0.0510) (0.0822) (0.0662) (0.0888) (0.0574) 
Log hh size -0.268*** -0.246*** -0.283*** -0.244*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0631) (0.0416) (0.0486) (0.0416) 
Log cell size -0.130*** -0.179*** -0.123*** -0.163*** -0.0629 
 (0.0267) (0.0394) (0.0357) (0.0494) (0.0433) 
Share of cell aged<5 -0.112 -0.132 -0.0606 -0.310 -0.0677 
 (0.0964) (0.133) (0.144) (0.200) (0.113) 
Share of cell adults 0.180** 0.0268 0.266** 0.167 0.200** 
 (0.0766) (0.115) (0.104) (0.144) (0.0982) 
Has formal schooling 0.265*** 0.149** 0.314*** 0.218*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0631) (0.0432) (0.0525) (0.0455) 
Fostered 0.116** 0.142* 0.106 0.165** 0.0425 
 (0.0512) (0.0755) (0.0703) (0.0765) (0.0646) 
Fostered young -0.0101 -0.0462 -0.0147 -0.157 0.101 
 (0.0658) (0.103) (0.0887) (0.116) (0.0824) 
Age at first marriage 0.000280 0.00384 -0.00138 -0.00232 0.00442 
 (0.00273) (0.00413) (0.00357) (0.00396) (0.00379) 
Inherited land -0.0759* -0.0348 -0.0943 -0.107* -0.0408 
 (0.0442) (0.0682) (0.0577) (0.0606) (0.0532) 
Inherited house 0.0748** 0.0649 0.0864* 0.0636 0.0880* 
 (0.0365) (0.0612) (0.0441) (0.0525) (0.0450) 
Other inheritance 0.0685* 0.0474 0.109* 0.163*** -0.0158 
 (0.0415) (0.0552) (0.0611) (0.0556) (0.0508) 
Rural -0.276***   -0.291*** -0.273*** 
 (0.0602)   (0.0824) (0.0650) 
Constant 13.21*** 13.62*** 12.74*** 13.88*** 13.77*** 
 (0.289) (0.484) (0.324) (0.496) (0.362) 
Observations 3,392 1,756 1,636 1,479 1,913
R2 0.427 0.245 0.375 0.443 0.426 
Note: Robust st. errors in parentheses, clustered at the h’hold level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ refer to children of the same 
father, same mother. Regressions contain department dummies.  Reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, 
all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’,  share of cell members 5-15,  no and non-formal schooling. 
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Table A11: Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on ag 
employment: sample with father or mother dead 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Rural Urban Men Women 
       
Father in farming 0.0106 0.00760 -0.00157 -0.0136 0.0304 
 (0.0190) (0.0382) (0.00929) (0.0302) (0.0210) 
Mother in farm 0.0513* 0.0771* 0.0184 0.0545 0.0407 
 (0.0262) (0.0468) (0.0203) (0.0398) (0.0260) 
Father in non-farm -0.0196 -0.101* 9.26e-05 -0.0545 0.00509 
 (0.0248) (0.0591) (0.0100) (0.0401) (0.0317) 
Mother in non-farm -0.101*** -0.219*** -0.0200*** -0.125*** -0.0696*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0622) (0.00695) (0.0386) (0.0194) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.122*** -0.287***  -0.162*** -0.0788*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0507)  (0.0302) (0.0136) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.00604 -0.0216 -0.00387 0.0345 -0.0561*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0969) (0.00961) (0.0623) (0.0206) 
Father’s schooling -0.0796** -0.185** -0.0119 -0.104** -0.0533 
 (0.0334) (0.0791) (0.0150) (0.0486) (0.0389) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0106 0.00760 -0.00157 -0.0136 0.0304 
 (0.0190) (0.0382) (0.00929) (0.0302) (0.0210) 
Own schooling -0.0259 -0.0660 -0.00936 -0.0707** 0.0464 
 (0.0205) (0.0534) (0.00829) (0.0314) (0.0305) 
Inherited land 0.0546** 0.101** 0.00372 0.0114 0.110*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0438) (0.0107) (0.0327) (0.0335) 
Inherited house 0.0205 0.0225 0.0157 0.0121 0.0215 
 (0.0197) (0.0415) (0.0103) (0.0298) (0.0223) 
Inherited other -0.0406** -0.0648* -0.0137* -0.0379 -0.0239 
 (0.0181) (0.0386) (0.00730) (0.0282) (0.0190) 
Observations 2,481 1,253 1,133 1,161 1,231 
Pseudo R2 0.323 0.218 0.270 0.314 0.400 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
 * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The regressions include controls listed in Table 5 notes.  
The ‘other’ occupation drops out of the urban regressions as it is found only in rural areas. 
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Table 10(a): Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on non-
agricultural employment, sample with father or mother dead   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Rural Urban Men Women 
Father in farming 0.00983 -0.0163 0.0541 0.0479 -0.0169 
 (0.0324) (0.0358) (0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0425) 
Mother in farm -0.0471 -0.0347 0.00368 -0.0819 -0.00896 
 (0.0360) (0.0377) (0.0514) (0.0511) (0.0452) 
Father in non-farm 0.0400 0.140** -0.00127 0.0683 0.0232 
 (0.0350) (0.0586) (0.0375) (0.0512) (0.0478) 
Mother in non-farm 0.182*** 0.184** 0.149*** 0.180*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0717) (0.0327) (0.0602) (0.0490) 
Father in ‘other’ -0.111 -0.113 -0.0772 -0.0648 -0.0856 
 (0.141) (0.147) (0.168) (0.165) (0.189) 
Mother in ‘other’ -0.309*** -0.196*** -0.357*** -0.418*** -0.142 
 (0.0795) (0.0443) (0.0739) (0.101) (0.189) 
Father’s schooling -0.0246 -0.0937 0.0350 -0.0279 -0.0217 
 (0.0416) (0.0632) (0.0412) (0.0707) (0.0518) 
Mother’s schooling 0.0126 0.193* -0.0640 0.104 -0.0567 
 (0.0640) (0.114) (0.0694) (0.100) (0.0703) 
Own schooling 0.0709** 0.0588 0.0601* 0.154*** 0.0117 
 (0.0307) (0.0537) (0.0319) (0.0406) (0.0404) 
Inherited land -0.0131 -0.000791 0.00551 0.00829 -0.00440 
 (0.0328) (0.0381) (0.0424) (0.0450) (0.0438) 
Inherited house -0.00395 -0.0226 -0.00237 -0.0286 0.0121 
 (0.0296) (0.0368) (0.0352) (0.0412) (0.0372) 
Inherited other 0.0397 -0.0116 0.103*** 0.00757 0.0813** 
 (0.0284) (0.0325) (0.0328) (0.0372) (0.0377) 
      
Observations 2,476 1,237 1,234 1,168 1,308 
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.173 0.158 0.281 0.190 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  The regressions include controls listed in Table 5. 
 
